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ABSTRACT
Social Preferences and the Willingness to Pay for Preventative Health Care:




This dissertation explores behavioral incentives generated by individuals making
choices in peer group settings in order to assess whether these incentives can be
harnessed towards improving people’s willingness to invest in undersubscribed pre-
ventative health care products. The first chapter uses a randomized field experiment
to explore whether increasing the visibility of individual choices to peer groups im-
pacts willingness to pay for water treatment products, by triggering the desire to
engage in socially desirable behavior in public. The second chapter uses a random-
ized field experiment to analyze if sequential decision making in peer group settings
exerts an impact on individual willingness to pay for first-movers owing to leadership
effects, and compares outcomes between randomly appointed, self-selected and nat-
ural leaders. The third chapter compares altruistic product subsidies - which can be
shared with other individuals - against individual subsidies in generating greater take
x
up of water treatment products, and assesses the likelihood of individuals selecting
into altruistic subsidies if sorting out of these arrangements is allowed.
xi
CHAPTER I
Buying Clean to be Seen? Image Motivation and
the Willingness to Pay for Preventative Health
Care Products
1.1 Abstract
Using data from a randomized field experiment in the setting of community groups in
rural Pakistan, I investigate whether increasing the visibility of an individual’s choices
to their peer group affects their willingness to pay for water treatment products. I
find evidence in favor of greater conformity with group behavior in public, with
randomization into public bidding increasing the odds of individuals bidding closer
to their expectations regarding the average group bid. The intersection of preferences
for conformity with low expectations regarding the average willingness to pay for the
product results in lower bids in public than private. However, bidders who express
no expectations regarding group behavior have higher bids when randomized into
public bidding, in line with status seeking in the absence of motives to conform. I
find stronger conformity and status seeking patterns in villages with above median
contamination levels. Priming bidders with the salience of health externalities and
the negative spillovers from poor individual investment in preventative health care
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results in higher bids in public. This is congruous with greater status seeking when
the pro-social signaling value of individual behavior is increased, highlighting the
importance of framing in eliciting socially desirable behavior.
1.2 Introduction
The current empirical literature on peer effects demonstrates that social networks
can influence a diverse set of individual choices, ranging from saving (Duflo and
Saez, 2002) to investment (Hong, Kubik and Stein, 2004) and technology adoption
(Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2001). In particular, we have com-
pelling evidence for peer networks facilitating the take up of a variety of health
technologies such as deworming pills (Miguel and Kremer, 2004), insecticide treated
bed nets (Dupas, 2014) and menstrual cups (Oster and Thronton, 2011). However,
the role attributed to peer networks in this literature is limited to one of information
diffusion and learning facilitation. Experiments from the lab and field on altruistic
behavior and public good contributions demonstrate that social networks can also
be powerful catalysts for socially desirable behavior by triggering image motivation,
or the desire to seek approval from others. Yet, the presence or strength of these mo-
tivations in influencing decision making over health remains unexplored, in spite of
the enduring problem of low spending on preventative health care and steep demand
curves at positive prices.
This paper utilizes a large field experiment in rural Pakistan to test for the presence of
image motivation in the willingness to purchase a preventative health care product -
chlorine tablets for Point of Use (POU) drinking water treatment. Image motivation
is the tendency of individual behavior to be affected by the perception of others,
the impact of which is inherently tied to how visible individual behavior is to their
social reference group (Ariely et al., 2009). I outline a basic model that incorporates
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image motivation in an individual’s utility function as arising from a desire for status
seeking and conformity. Status seeking is achieved by differentiating yourself from
the average group behavior and conformity is achieved by aligning yourself more
closely with the group. The model demonstrates that for a person whose individual
optimum lies below their expectation of the group average, conformity and status
seeking coincide to drive their demand up towards the group average. However, for a
person whose individual optimum lies above the group average, conformity pressures
will lower their willingness to pay while status seeking will operate to increase it. The
model therefore yields testable hypotheses on how visibility can affect willingness to
pay for a product, which I proceed to apply in an empirical setting.
I engineer the sale of our POU chlorine tablets in the setting of pre-existing commu-
nity groups in the sample villages and randomize whether an individual’s maximum
willingness to pay for the product is private or is revealed to their group, in order
to assess whether economic behavior changes when image motivation is an added
consideration in the decision process.
The setting for my experiment has the essential components of a population that is
organized into community groups(COs) where the impacts of image motivation can
be tested: the need for investment in drinking water treatment methods owing to
widespread contamination of drinking water; and a drinking water treatment prod-
uct that is unavailable in the local marketplace and can therefore be sold exclusively
through the meetings of the community groups. The social groups utilized are en-
dogenously formed and have a history of repeated interaction, which yields greater
weight to social signaling than if these groups were randomly generated and had
no history of association. The mechanism used for demand elicitation - the Becker
DeGroot Marschack (BDM) auction- has been tested in a similar population of low
numeracy and shown consistent results (Berry et al., 2015).
Randomization at the level of the individual ensures that the treatment effect is
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driven only by changes in bidding environment from private to public and not other
unobserved, correlated variables at the group level. The comparison of public and
private bidders provides estimates of the impact of visibility of actions on behavior.
Decisions are made simultaneously and without consultation to eliminate learning or
sequential herding effects. In addition, all individuals are given a uniform information
treatment prior to the randomization, in order to reduce variance in the level of
knowledge among group members.
I collect individual beliefs regarding the average bid at the group level prior to ran-
domization assignment. As such, my measure of conformity is with respect to the
descriptive norm − what other individuals are doing − as opposed to the injunctive
norm − what people ought to be doing. Therefore, my experiment speaks to the
literature on the impact of beliefs regarding the descriptive norm and not the litera-
ture on injunctive norms. Moreover, my experiment is a one-shot game. Therefore,
there is no updating of individual beliefs before the bidding is completed. Hence,
unlike other experiments that provide information regarding the descriptive norm,
I collect individual beliefs regarding the norm and assess how randomization affects
individual behavior relative to these exogenously held beliefs.
I find that the overall treatment effect of making bids visible is zero and insignificant.
Looking at result by beliefs regarding group behavior, I find that bidders who are
bidding in public have significantly smaller disparity between their bid and their
expectations regarding the average bid in the group, suggesting greater conformity
in public. In addition, public bidding results in a significantly higher probability
of bidders placing bids which are equal to their expectation of the average group
bid. This effect is driven by the portion of the bidding distribution where bidders
are bidding in excess of their expectations regarding the average group bid, and
therefore manifests itself as a reduction in bids in public towards the expectation of
group behavior. This effect is also heterogeneous across the distribution, deriving
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primarily from bidders who are already bidding closer to their expectation regarding
the group bid. On the other hand, bidders who have no beliefs regarding group
behavior bid higher in public than private, which is consistent with pure status
seeking behavior in the absence of conformity influences.
These results shed light on a feature of individual adoption behavior that may form
one piece of the puzzle of low technology adoption equilibria persisting in developing
country settings. Hence, as Ray (1998) points out, in the presence of complemen-
tarities in adoption and use of technologies, groups or societies can get stuck in low
adoption traps if a critical mass of individuals fails to adopt. Social norms can create
strong complementarities by encouraging conformity. Hence, where norms are poor,
groups can get stuck in a low adoption equilibrium owing to the complementary
incentives of exercising conformity with these poor norms, even though individual
adoption may be preferred in the absence of such complementarities. This appears
to be the case in our setting where private bidders are able to exercise higher will-
ingness to pay than public bidders, since they are not subject to the demands of
conformity to poor norms. This feature of individual behavior therefore highlights
the importance of shaping and improving social norms in the technology adoption
debate, since these norms may be crucial to the technology adoption equilibrium
that evolves in societies characterized by strong adherence to social norms. More-
over, the fact of poor norms persisting in these societies may provide one piece of
the puzzle regarding why these societies are stuck in low adoption equilibria with
respect to beneficial health care technologies, given that the poor norms reinforce
poor adoptions rates.
I find that social motivation effects are stronger when contamination rates are higher.
Hence, both conformity and status seeking appear to be stronger motivators in high
contamination environments relative to low contamination environments where the
effects are muted and insignificant, suggesting that the role of social motivations is
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mediated by the severity of the problem being addressed and therefore the value of
the social signal generated from remedial action.
I also test for whether priming with information regarding health spillovers interacts
with the impact of social motivation. I randomize some groups into receiving an
additional information message which highlights the negative externalities attendant
on the community from individual failure to adopt better health behaviors owing
to the parasitic and infectious nature of gastrointestinal diseases. I find that the
dampening effect of conformity on bidding behavior is reversed in public when bidders
are randomized into the externalities treatment. Consequently, priming bidders on
the externalities of their health behaviors results in bidders bidding higher in public
than in private. This can be attributable to stronger status seeking behavior when
the pro-social value of the signal is higher, which operates to counteract conformity
influences which dominate when such priming of pro-social value is not done.
Given evidence in the psychology literature indicating differences between genders in
their willingness and propensity to conform, I test whether men and women behave
differently with respect to the treatment. I find that in mixed groups men are less
likely to demonstrate conformity patterns than women, in line with expectations
from existing work investigating gender differences in conformism. However, the
evidence from all-male and all-female groups is less conclusive.
A third and simultaneous treatment arm tests the impact of allowing self-selection
of bidding environment. This arm allows me to intuit the impact of sorting and
self-selection on treatment effects, which is conceivably more representative of long
run outcomes where experimental control is weakened. Here I find that over 60%
of bidders would prefer to bid in private. Moreover, once self-selection is allowed,
conformity trends disappear in public and standard image motivation results emerge
of higher bids in public. Hence, the choice of mechanism appears to impact the type
of social motivations that will evolve in equilibrium. However, the current design
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does not allow me to make any claims as to whether the mechanism itself alters
preferences over conformity and status seeking, or whether the results are driven by
the sorting of conformists into private bidding and status seekers into public bidding.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on using behavioral incentives that
appeal to social considerations and social norms to direct individual behavior in di-
rections that conform with goals of public policy. Hence, social norms have been
leveraged to increase individual voting (Gerber and Rogers, 2009), environmental
conservation (Goldstein, Cialdini and Griskevicius, 2008), and electricity conserva-
tion (Allcott, 2011).
This paper is unique insofar as it is the first field experiment to investigate so-
cial norms and pro-social motivations in health settings and health care purchase
decisions, in a literature derived primarily from applications to public goods and al-
truistic behavior. Insofar as health care expenditures in developing country settings
have large spillovers, I test whether the same pro-social motivations that increase
altruism and public good contributions in public can also be leveraged to increase
the willingness to pay for preventative health care. As such, my research question
bears closest resemblance to the application of social norms to conservation behavior
and the emerging literature on conspicuous conservation (Griskevicius et al., 2010)
where individuals bear higher costs or compromise on the quality of consumption
choices in order to derive greater status from appearing more ’green’. I apply this
concept to test whether people will be willing to pay more for health from a desire
to seek status from their actions.
The existing literature on social influences affecting health-seeking behavior, while
small, also shows weak treatment effects overall. Bronchetti et al. (2015) test whether
peer endorsement of flu vaccination in college campuses results in an increase in
vaccine take-up and find no effect on take up margin for a very large sample of over
9000 observations. They do, however, find evidence that peer endorsement increases
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the likelihood of students opening emails that contain health information. However,
their setting is one that may activate a sense of obligation to social norms but does
not alter the visibility of follow through and therefore does not activate the social
pressure channels I seek to investigate.
My work also shares similarities with the Guiteras et al. (2016), where messaging
regarding shame and disgust at being seen consuming dirty water is exploited in an
attempt to increase usage of POU chlorine and test willingness to pay for a com-
munity level chlorine dispenser. While they find little to no treatment effects, they
attribute this to low levels of social cohesion in the sample communities, where peo-
ple placed little regard on the behavior of others even though behaviors were visible.
In addition, because their chlorine product was communal, the elicitation of clean
demand estimates is further complicated by problems of group coordination and free-
riding that may arise with shared commodities. My setting, on the other hand, uses
endogenously formed peer groups which have a long history of repeated interaction
where reputation concerns are more salient. My focus is also on the salience of vis-
ibility of actions to generating demand for an under subscribed behavior, owing to
reputational concerns, and not on the role of messaging.
In addition, this paper relates to the literature on the use of groups motivators to
improve incentives for individually beneficial behavior. Hence, studies on incentiviz-
ing under subscribed health behaviors such as exercising (Babcock et al., 2015) and
cognitive exercises among the elderly to improve mental health (Schofield et al. 2015)
find that group based incentives out perform individual incentives and people appear
to value rewards to team members greater than rewards to themselves. This work
provides additional evidence on another feature of social groups, image motivation
derived from visibility of individual behavior, which can also be leveraged to influ-
ence individual behavior towards socially desirable outcomes. In doing so, it helps
build a case for the use of groups as treatment units in public health settings where
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externalities abound and there is consequently greater motivation to exercise other-
regarding behavior when you also possess pro-social preferences and an opportunity
to signal these preferences in public.
1.3 Current Literature
1.3.1 Image Motivation
The claim that people alter their behavior when under public scrutiny relies on the
theory of preference signaling whereby if underlying preferences are unobservable,
actions are used as signals for an individual’s true preferences over socially desirable
characteristics. As a result, visible actions confer status or prestige if they reflect
society’s definition of good behavior.
Literature indicates that people’s behavior in public can reflect a desire to both
stand out and to fit in. Bernheim (1994) models individual utility as deriving from
intrinsic preferences as well as a desire for status, which is decreasing in deviation
from the social norm. Such norm compliance or conformity has been attributed to
information influence and normative influence. In the former case, people seek to
resolve ambiguity and uncertainty most efficiently by using the decisional shortcut of
registering what others are doing − the descriptive norm − and imitating the actions
of the group (Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren, 1990). In the latter case, conformity
is triggered by a desire to gain greater affiliation with the group, generate social
approval and avoid sanction (Griskevicius et al., 2006).
The power of social norms to influence behavior has been investigated in a range of
domains from littering to recycling, conservation and tax evasion. Chen et al. (2010)
find that in an online community of movie reviewers when members are exposed to the
descriptive contribution norm, below mean contributors increase their contributions
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but above mean contributors decrease their level of contributions. Schultz et al.
(2007) find a similar boomerang effect in electricity conservation where the revelation
of average consumption statistics results in an increase in electricity consumption
among below mean consumers. Social norm interventions targeting binge drinking
among college students similarly find that interventions that reveal the prevalence
of binge drinking tend to increase drinking among non-regular binge drinkers while
reducing drinking among binge drinkers (Werch et al., 2000).
However, the costly signaling theory of pro-social behavior leans on the premise that
when individuals have preferences over the beliefs of others regarding themselves,
signaling yourself as a better type yields greater reward in social interactions - from
being more desirable as a friend or partner, to eliciting greater trust and increasing
the likelihood of being assigned to positions of power and authority (Griskevicius,
2010). As such, the greater the investment in costly signaling, the stronger the signal
of not only pro-social preferences but also the resources to incur the cost of public
welfare. In such a framework, the desire to stand out would dominate the desire to
fit in, with economic choices being driven by status seeking over conformity.
This has been borne out in the domain of charitable contributions and contribution
to public goods, where we find evidence of a more uniformly positive impact of image
motivation. Ariely, Bracha and Meier (2009) show that people expend more effort
for a pro-social cause when their actions are visible, in a lab setting. Andreoni and
Petrie (2004) demonstrate that contributions to public goods are also increasing in
the visibility of contributor decisions, and Hoffman et al. (1996) show that giving is
smallest in dictator games which are double blind, so that dictator behavior is not
known to anyone including the experimenter. Similarly, in a large field experiment
on door-to-door fundraising, DellaVigna List and Malmendier (2012) find that so-
cial pressure is a stronger motivator for charitable giving than altruism, owing to
significant numbers of givers opting out of the interaction with solicitors if provided
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with a low-cost method for doing so. Moreover, social pressure has been shown to
be effective in voter mobilization, with social pressure messaging which reveals the
voting records of voters to everyone in their neighborhood increases voter turnout by
3-8% points, relative to the 0.5% increase effected by typical direct mail messaging
that doesn’t involve the use of social pressure. (Panagopoulos, 2010).
This motive of status signaling is evidently tapped into by charities when they pub-
licly announce contributions (Ariely et al., 2009), blood donation agencies when
they offer public awards (Karlan and McConnell, 2014), and firefighter organization
when they offer vanity plates to volunteer (Carpenter and Myers, 2010). However,
while there is sufficient evidence for the ability of status motives to draw individual
behavior towards socially desirable outcomes, there are few attempts being made
towards activating these motives as a policy instrument for improving individually
sub-optimal behavior.
Also lacking is an analysis of how conformity to social norms can mediate signal-
ing behavior in public, which creates non-linearities in individual response to costly
signaling. Hence, conformity can drive behavior in an opposing direction to that
predicted by simple status signaling. Zafar (2011) provides some evidence of this in-
teraction when he finds that in a sequential decision making setting, while visibility
of choices increases overall contributions in a charitable contributions game, receiv-
ing information on a lower contribution norm leads to a reduction in contributions,
particularly in settings where participants are more likely to know one another. Con-
sequently, I model individual choice in public arising from both a desire to conform
and a desire to seek status.
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1.3.2 Low spending on Preventative Health Care
Preventative health care is a domain of economic decision making that suffers from
gross underinvestment by individuals, even when marginal benefits to increasing
expenditures is very high from an individual and social perspective. This problem is
particularly acute in the developing countries where the disease burden is incident
at a significantly younger age and the infectious and parasitic nature of diseases
produces large health externalities.
Drinking contaminated water is the leading cause of diarrheal and gastrointestinal
diseases which claim the lives of 1.6 million children each year (Ahuja et al., 2010).
In addition to their mortality impact, repeated episodes of diarrhea at a young age
lead to stunting and wasting and lack of cognitive development which has severe
implications for human capital accumulation and labor market returns. Moreover,
repeated exposure to fecal pathogens can irreversibly affect the absorptive capacity
of the intestinal tract of adults and children, even when there are no overt symptoms
of morbidity. (Guiteras et al., 2016)
Diarrhea transmission occurs through the fecal-oral route, with the majority of in-
fections spreading through feces-contaminated water. Given the unimproved nature
of sanitation and drainage in developing countries, unsafe disposal of human waste
exacerbates the potential for negative externalities from individual cases of infection.
Consequently, the social benefits from providing greater protection against diarrheal
diseases outstrips individual benefits.
Randomized controlled trials of Point of Use (POU) drinking water treatment indi-
cate that with take-up rates on the order of 70 percent, POU treatment products
can reduce childhood diarrhea by 20-40% (Kremer et al., 2011). However, even
amongst populations with high knowledge regarding water borne disease transmis-
sion, the willingness to pay for POU water treatment products is low and demand
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curves for the products are precipitously steep at positive prices. Hence, Kremer
et al. (2011) find that despite 30% of their sample professing to prior experience
with the POU water treatment product and 95% professing favorable views of the
product, demand/utilization of the product falls from 80% to 10% when going from
a full subsidy to a 50% subsidy, with no significant change in demand between a
50% subsidy and full price. The demand is also not higher amongst households with
young children, who stand to benefit the most from water treatment.
Given the low cost of chlorine, POU water treatment using chlorine products is a
highly cost-effective solution to diarrheal disease reduction. However, free provision
of chlorine is not a sustainable solution in many settings. Therefore, we would like to
assess the channels by which we can improve the willingness to pay for POU chlorine
water treatment products. An appeal to image motivations is an aspect of demand
for health care that remains, to date, unexplored. I extend the application of image
motivation to the realm of decision making over health expenditures and test the
impact of increasing the visibility of purchase decision making on willingness to pay
for water treatment products in a peer group setting.
1.4 Behavioral Hypotheses
Consider a simple model where an individual’s utility is additively separable in: (a)
consumption of a status good, x; (b) consumption of all other goods/wealth, y; and
(c) social approval, S.
U = u(x) + u(y) + αs ∗ S
where αs is the weight put on social utility. We model image motivation along the
lines of Akerlof (1997) where social utility can be generated from a status seeking or
a conformity. As per the status seeking model, an individual’s utility is diminishing
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in the distance they fall behind their reference group’s consumption of the status
good. The conformist model dictates that the individual minimize the social distance
between themselves and others in their reference group.
Hence I define social approval, S, as:
S = S0 + v[−βc(x− x̄)2 − βs(x̄− x)]
where βc is the weight placed on conformity and βs is the weight placed on status
seeking; x̄ is the average group behavior; v is a visibility parameter indicating how
visible an individual’s actions are to their reference group.
Assuming an interior optimum, I can solve for the optimal x∗:
u′(x∗) + αsv[−2βc(x∗ − x̄) + βs] = 0
which gives us the comparative statics:
δx/δv = αs
u′′(x∗) [2βc(x
∗ − x̄) − βs]
Hence, the impact of increasing visibility of actions is inextricably related to the
direction and distance of an individual from the group average.
Status seeking motivations decrease utility when you fall below the group average
and increase utility as positive distance from the group increases, i.e. you out per-
form the group. Utility from conformity, however, is derived from decreasing the
distance between yourself and the average group member. Hence, for people whose
individual optima lie below the group average, the direction of status seeking and
conformity motivations both operate to increase bids in an equilibrium with greater
visibility. However, for people whose individual optimum lies above the group av-
erage, the motivations derived from status seeking and conformity are at odds with
one another. The desire to conform will drive such people to lower their optimum in
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public, whereas the desire for status seeking will increase their desire to raise their
optimal consumption of the status good.
In our setting, therefore, for people who are bidding below their expectations regard-
ing average group behavior, we will be unable to disentangle the effects of status
seeking from conformity. However, for bidders bidding above their expectation re-
garding the average group bid, an increase in bids in public can only be reconciled
with stronger status seeking than conformity and a decrease in bids in public implies
stronger conformity influences and weaker status seeking motivations.
These effects are moderated by the strength of conformity motivations, βc, and the
strength of status seeking motivations, βc. Moreover, the overall impact of social
motivations depends on the weight placed on social utility, αs. Given that the the-
oretical and empirical foundation for status seeking is derived from the literature
on pro-social behavior, we can hypothesize that an exogenous increase in how pro-
social a behavior is deemed will result in a stronger impetus to derive status from
engaging in the behavior (tantamount to an increase in βs). Hence, for example,
highlighting the salience of health spillovers will theoretically result in an increase
in the perception of individual choice having pro-social implications, resulting in a
higher propensity for individual’s to incorporate status seeking motivations in their
behavior. Similarly, we can expect the strength of social motivations (αs) to also be
mediated by the degree of contamination in the environment. Hence, in low contam-
ination environments, the value of signaling by way of investment in water treatment
technology may be smaller than in environments characterized by high levels of con-
tamination where health seeking behaviors are viewed as more important.
We turn to empirical data to shed light on how these different motivations operate




The experiment is conducted in 69 villages drawn from 3 districts in rural Pakistan.
I collaborate with a local NGO, the National Rural Support Program, which has
coordinated community mobilization activities in these villages for the past several
years. The study districts are subdivided into 4 Social Mobilization Teams (SMTs)
- aggregations of spatially proximate villages employed by the NRSP to organize
community mobilization activities.
Our study villages are ideal for studying the impact of image motivation in group
settings since they were organized by the NRSP into endogenously formed community
groups which have been conducting group meetings over the course of the past 6
years. Hence, they have a history of interaction in a group setting. In addition, the
mobilization effort was undertaken as part of a prior field experiment that required
for at least 60% of the village population to be organized into community groups.
Hence, group composition is more generalizable to the ordinary village populace
than if these groups had smaller coverage and therefore participation engendered
stronger selection effects. Moreover, since the prior mobilization work had no direct
relation with health care, any selection that may have taken place can be assumed
as orthogonal to the health behaviors being studied.
Water testing conducted in 2013 on a sample of households in these villages revealed
the presence of E coli at points of source (40% at the median across the full sample)
and storage (80% at the median across the full sample). Household surveys indicated,
however, that a mere 3% of respondents reported treating their water in any way to
make it safer to drink. Boiling was the method by which most households treated




The water treatment product introduced to these communities is chlorine tablets
for Point of Use (POU) drinking water treatment. This choice was motivated by
household survey data which indicates that the vast majority of household drinking
water sources are individual or shared, with very few instances of community level
water sources. Therefore, community level water treatment products that have shown
great promise in recent literature (Kremer et al. 2011) are unsuitable for our field
setting.
Chlorine products are also superior to filtration methods and boiling since they pro-
vide residual protection from recontamination which is important in rural environ-
ments with low levels of sanitation and overall hygiene and therefore high likelihood
of recontamination post-treatment.
Aquatabs, our product of choice, are imported and distributed by a local supplier but
they are currently unavailable in the rural marketplace. Therefore, our experimental
setting also has the unique feature that we are the sole suppliers of the product being
auctioned and therefore the only point of access to water treatment products for the
vast majority of households who do not have access to large urban centers where
competing products may be procured. Therefore, their purchasing decisions in the
experimental setting are not influenced by access to close substitutes outside of the
experimental environment.
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1.5.3 Demand Elicitation mechanism
I utilize a Becker DeGroot Marschak (BDM) mechanism to elicit individual level
willingness to pay for the product. This is a widely used mechanism for eliciting
individual valuations over a good or experience, that has been tested by Berry et
al. (2015) in a comparable field setting with a population having low numeracy,
and shown results consistent with the standard Take it or Leave it offer method for
demand estimation. In this mechanism, participants are told regarding the range of
offer prices and asked what their maximum willingness to pay is, given the possible
set of prices. The price is then determined randomly. If the price drawn is larger
than the reservation price stated by the respondent, they are unable to purchase
the product. Conversely, if the price drawn is lesser than the reservation price, the
respondent has to purchase the product at the price that they drew. Therefore,
the mechanism ensures that respondent’s dominant strategy is to reveal their true
maximum willingness to pay for the product. (Mazar et al. 2010)
The mechanism is incentive compatible for expected utility maximizers. However, it
may depend on the price distribution amongst people who do not maximize expected
utility. However, Mazar et al (2010) show that using a titration-based modified BDM
procedure that elicits willingness to pay for the entire sequence of available prices
nearly eliminates sensitivity to the price distribution. We therefore use a similar
titration-based procedure where willingness to pay for each possible price draw is
elicited.
1.5.4 Implementation
My experimental sample comprises 322 independent community groups. However, in
order to ensure minimum meeting size, smaller groups were combined with spatially
proximate groups to yield 219 meetings, varying in size from a minimum of 5 par-
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ticipants to a maximum of 30 participants per meeting. The groups may be single
gender (all-male or all-female) or of mixed gender composition.
Upon arrival to the meeting, participants are divided into one of the three treatment
arms, by being assigned cards belonging to one of three colors which are visibly dis-
played on their person. However, the nature of randomization is not yet revealed. All
participants participate in an information session that highlights the levels of water
contamination found in their drinking water during tests conducted in 2013, possi-
ble sources of contamination and common water borne illnesses and their impacts.
They are subsequently introduced to the auction product – Aquatabs – and provided
with instructions on how to correctly use the product, and exercise safe storage of
drinking water once it has been treated. Participants are then given a taste test of
the product.
Next, the participants are trained in the BDM bidding mechanism. The enumerator
describes the BDM procedure, placing emphasis on the dominant strategy being the
revelation of true willingness to pay. It is also emphasized that increasing bids raises
probability of being able to purchase the product while lowering bids lowers this
probability, but that the final price paid is randomly determined. Respondents are
told they can only bid once and cannot revise bids once the price has been drawn.
They are also told that they must purchase the product if the price drawn is lower
than their bid.
The enumerators use soap to conduct a practice round of the auction with a volunteer
participant from the meeting. The practice auction using soap is implemented in full
view of all participants to ensure their proper understanding.
The participants are then fielded a short survey which tests each individual for their
understanding of the bidding mechanism and collects some basic information regard-
ing prevalent practices regarding illness and water treatment. The respondents are
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asked a battery of questions to test their comprehension of the bidding mechanism.
The questions deal with the change in probability of winning the product if an indi-
vidual bid is raised or lowered, respectively, and the outcome of a hypothetical bid
and price draw. Each of these questions is asked twice, employing different numbers
for bids/prices. If a respondent answers incorrectly the first time, the enumerator
explains the bidding mechanism again and asks them the question again with a differ-
ent set of prices/bids. If they still answer incorrectly, the correct answer is explained
to them a second time and they are allowed to proceed but their incorrect response
is recorded. This allows us to record which participants likely submitted bids with
incomplete comprehension of the bidding mechanism.
Once the survey has been completed, participants are told regarding their treatment
assignment. Once treatment assignment is revealed, silence is ensured in the meeting
while bids are collected individually in a separate enclosure.
The range of possible prices for the product are set between Rs. 60 and Rs. 150,
reflecting a 75% to 37.5% discount on the market price of the product (Rs. 240).
The participant is asked whether they are willing to pay each possible price between
Rs. 60 and Rs. 150 in Rs. 10 increments. If they are unwilling to purchase the
product at Rs. 60, they are asked what minimum price between Rs. 0 and Rs. 60
they would be willing to pay. If they are willing to purchase the product at Rs. 150,
they are additionally asked for the maximum they would be willing to pay between
Rs. 150 and Rs. 240. The maximum willingness to pay, hence elicited, comprises
the final bid of the participants.
1.5.5 Treatments
Public treatment: Participants assigned to the public arm are told that once all
the bids have been collected, their bid will be announced to other members of their
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meeting.
Private treatment: Participants assigned to the private arm are told that their
bid will not be revealed to other members of their meeting.
Self-Selection treatment: Participants assigned to the self-selection arm are told
that they have the choice of whether to keep their bids private or public. If they
choose private their bids are not revealed at the end of the meeting, and vice versa.
The instructions regarding assignment to public vs. private treatment are revealed
publicly during the meeting. The instructions to the self-selection arm are only
revealed during direct interaction with the enumerator and not revealed to the general
meeting participants. However, their decision regarding whether to bid privately or
publicly can be backed out at the end of the meeting based on whether their bid is
revealed or not.
I also introduce an overlaid randomization that varies whether bidders are primed
regarding the negative health spillovers on friends and neighbors of a failure to invests
in preventative health care at the individual level. By priming individuals on health
externalities, we seek to increase how pro-social individual actions are perceived by
highlighting that their benefits accrue not only to the individual but to the larger
community as well. This externalities treatment is randomized at the village level
to prevent information spillover between group within a village.
1.5.6 Randomization
I employ a between-subject design with randomization at the individual level, within
meetings. For each day of the week, enumerators are provided with a randomiza-
tion list by which to make the assignment, so that randomization is not systematic
but still ensures balance of assignment as much as possible within each meeting.
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(See Appendix Table A5 for sample randomization list). Hence, the order by which
participants arrive at the meeting determines the treatment arm to which they are
assigned but the order by which treatment arms are assigned is itself random by day
of week. In addition, the assignment of groups (meetings) to the experiment was
itself randomized from a larger sample space of 652 meetings. The randomization
was stratified by SMT and gender composition of meeting.
Selection arises in show up to the meeting on the date of the study, since not all
members of each community group participate on the day of the meeting. However,
this does not affect the internal validity of the randomization.
Table A1 shows the summary statistics between the three randomization arms. There
is balance across all the variables except for education, with bidders in the private
arm having slightly lower education on average than in the public and opt arms.
Consequently, I employ a small set of demographic controls in all our regression
specifications to account for these differences between groups, and to improve the
precision of our estimates.
In addition, looking at the unconditional distribution of bids in the data in Figure
1, we can see that there are strong shifts in the distribution by SMT. Therefore, I
employ SMT fixed effects in the majority of our specifications to reduce noise in our
estimates (unless otherwise noted). Finally, I cluster standard errors at the meeting
level to account for correlated unobservable in our error term.
1.5.7 Norm Elicitation
Prior to the revelation of the randomization arms and the randomization assignment,
participants are asked regarding their expectations of the average bid placed by other
participants in the meeting. We use this measure as a proxy for the respondents’
beliefs regarding the social norm governing the product. As such, our measure of
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norms is a reflection of beliefs regarding the descriptive norm - what people are doing
- as opposed to the injunctive norm - what people ought to be doing.
Since our norm elicitation precedes the revelation of randomization, it precludes
any strategic considerations that may vary by treatment randomization. As demon-
sstrated in Figure 4, the distribution of expectations regarding the average bid in the
group is invariant between the two treatment arms. In addition, Figure 3 demon-
strates that the expectations regarding the average group bid are also fairly invariant
across the bidding distribution, suggesting the presence of a somewhat stable norm
across the sample, regardless of the actual bid placed.
In addition, a subsample of our respondents profess to having no expectation regard-
ing the average bid in the group - our NoNorm subsample. As shown in Table A1,
this subgroup is roughly 20% of the total sample and is also uniformly distributed
between treatment arms. Our randomization therefore ensures that there are no sys-
tematic differences between individuals with NoNorm who are assigned to different
treatment arms, and we can assess treatment effects on this subsample as well.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Public vs. Private bidding (No self-selection):
Performing non-parametric rank-sum tests (MWW), we can compare bid distribu-
tions between different treatment arms. Comparing the subsample of bids falling in
the public and private treatment arms only, we are unable to reject the null hypoth-
esis of equality of distributions (z= -0.285, p= 0.7758).
Table 1.1 utilizes a regression framework to explore our findings. We estimate the
following:
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MWTPim = α + β1Publicim +Xim + fe+ εim
where MWTPim is the maximum willingness to pay of individual i in meeting m, as
reflected in their BDM bid; Publicim is an indicator for whether the individual was
randomized into the public bidding arm; Xim is a vector of individual level controls
including gender, age, household size, number children in household, and poverty
score; fe is fixed effects, which vary by specification; and, εim is an error term which
is clustered at the meeting level.
Looking at the overall effect of randomization into the public arm, relative to the
private arm, I find small and statistically insignificant coefficients across all fixed
effect specifications. While imprecisely estimated, the coefficients are very small
relative to the mean value of the dependent variable. We can conclude, therefore,
that the average treatment effect of making bidding behavior visible is negligible.
Since the simple linear regression specification only compares conditional means
across the distribution, I employ a quantile regression in Table 1.2 to investigate
how the treatment effects differ by their location on the distribution of bids. I dis-
cover that the tail end of the bid distribution is affected by the public treatment, with
a very large positive coefficient on the public treatment arm for the tenth quantile
which is statistically significant at the 10% level. The coefficient represents nearly
50% of the mean bid in this quantile, suggesting very strong treatment effects but
on a very small portion of the bid distribution.
1.6.2 Treatment Effects by Beliefs Regarding Group Behav-
ior: Conformity and Status Seeking
In order to evaluate the effects of conformity and status seeking on bidding behavior
we must also incorporate the bidders’ beliefs regarding the bidding distribution into
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our empirical specification.
Figure 2 plots the distribution of the actual bids relative to the distribution of beliefs
regarding the average group bid. Visual inspection suggests that the distribution of
beliefs deviates from the distribution of actual bidding behavior. Using a Wilcoxon
signed rank sum test, I confirm that there is a statistically significant difference in
theses distributions, with the beliefs distribution having a lower rank overall. We
can anticipate, therefore, that since expectations regarding bidding behavior are more
pessimistic than the behavior itself, if conformists tendencies exist they will tend to
bias bids downwards owing to poorer beliefs than actual behavior.
1.6.2.1 Conformity to Beliefs regarding Group Behavior
In order to investigate the effects of conformity by treatment assignment, I construct
a variable that measures the difference between an individual’s bid and their belief
regarding the average group bid (BidNorm). DevNorm therefore measures how far
bidders are willing to deviate from their perception of the descriptive norm.
DevNormim = MWTPim −BidNormim.
Figure 5 plots the distribution of DevNorm by treatment arms of public and private
bidders. We can see from this figure that while the distributions appear identical at
the tails, the median of the public bids distribution is shifted towards the left of the
median for the private bids distribution, and appears more centered around zero.
In Table 1.3 I test the difference in DevNorm by treatment assignment across the
full sample.
DevNormim = α + β1Publicim +Xim + fe+ εim
I find a negative but weak and statistically insignificant reduction in DevNorm when
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bids are public. However, this specification only captures the treatment effect at
the conditional mean. Consequently, in Table 1.4 I employ a simultaneous quantile
regression to estimate the treatment effect for different deciles of the distribution of
DevNorm.
As Table 1.4 reveals, there is a strong and statistically significant tendency to re-
vise bids towards expectations regarding the average bid in the 30th, 40th and 50th
quartiles when bids are made publicly, with effects persisting into the 60th quartile
but with larger standard errors. All these quartiles coincide with positive devia-
tions from the BidNorm and therefore indicate that for bidders bidding above their
perception of the average group bid, public revelation drives their bids downwards
in the direction of their belief regarding group behavior. As per the comparative
statics of our model, since these bidders are bidding above their beliefs regarding the
group average, their reduction in bids is consistent with a preference for conformity
in public.
The treatment effect sizes in Table 1.4 range from 80% reduction in difference from
the norm for bidders who were already close to the average, to 16% for bidders in
the 60th percentile who are bidding farthest from their expectations regarding the
average bid. Figure 5 provides a visual representation of our results by plotting the
treatment effect coefficients from our specification in Table 1.4 by decile. We can
observe a consistent trend in favor of conformity in the middle of the distribution.
Hence, the tendency towards conformity is diminishing as the difference from average
bid increases, with the largest effects being seen amongst people who are bidding
more closely to their expectations regarding group behavior at the outset. This
would appear intuitive since these bidders are already locating themselves in the
vicinity of group behavior and visibility serves to make this motivation stronger.
In Table 1.5, I divide the sample into 3 groups: bidders who bid above their expecta-
tions regarding group behavior (Above Norm); bidders who bid at their expectation
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of group behavior (At Norm); and bidders who bid below their expectation of group
behavior (Below Norm). We present a simple tabulation of bidders with prior beliefs
against treatment assignment to public bidding to see if treatment assignment shifts
the distribution of bidders between the groups of ’Above Norm’, ’At Norm’ or ’Below
Norm’, which is a margin not clearly captured in our earlier specification. We find
that the vast majority of bidders are bidding above their beliefs regarding average
group behavior. However, assignment to public bidding results in a 5% reduction
in bidders who are bidding above their expectations regarding group behavior, with
bidders redistributing themselves on the norm or below it.
We examine this effect in a regression framework by employing a probit model to
assess the impact that public revelation of bids has on the odds of bidding above
the norm, with the inclusion of our controls and fixed effects. Table 1.6 shows our
results. The negative coefficient on ’Public’ indicates the randomization into public
bidding results in a statistically significantly lower likelihood of bidding higher than
your belief regarding the descriptive norm, in concordance with our results from
Table 1.4. In addition, the likelihood of bidding at ’At Norm’ increases significantly
in public, with a smaller increase in the likelihood of bidding below the norm.
Together, these results provide strong evidence in favor of the presence of conformity
in the randomized sample. Moreover, given that the conformity results are driven by
bidders who are bidding above their expectations regarding the average bid, these
results cannot be reconciled with a pure status seeking model which would lead
the bidders to bid higher in public and therefore increase the difference between
individual bids and the average bid.
However, it is also clear that the impact of conformity is not uniform across all bid-
ders, and is concentrated amongst bidders who are already bidding in the vicinity
of their beliefs regarding group behavior. Hence the utility from conformity cannot
be rationalized into a simple squared loss function specification and recognizing in-
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dividual differences in preferences for conformity − as captured by the βc parameter
in our model − is important. It is also important to note that existing literature
on norm compliance finds that individuals exercise conformity to group norms when
such norms are revealed to them even when their own actions are unobservable.
Hence, our measure of conformity is a lower bound for the overall influence of con-
formity on individual behavior. Therefore, among high valuation bidders who are
bidding well in excess of their beliefs regarding group behavior we cannot discount
the possibility that even though conformity effects are not visible, this is owing to
opposing status seeking effects and not as a result of weak or no conformity.
1.6.2.2 Status Seeking
Given that overall treatment effects were roughly zero, there must be some portion
of the sample that is not revising their bids downwards in public. We assess bidding
patterns for our excluded sub-sample: individuals who express no prior beliefs re-
garding group behavior in the bidding process and can plausibly be used to estimate
what would occur in the absence of conformity effects. We estimate:
MWTPim = α+β1Publicim+β2NoNormim+β3Public∗NoNormim+Xim+fe+εim
where NoNorm is an indicator for whether the bidder expressed no prior belief
over the bidding behavior of his meeting group and therefore β3 indicates the effect
of visibility of bids on bidders who have no prior beliefs regarding average group
behavior.
Table 1.7 shows the results of this specification. We find that bidders who express
no beliefs regarding group behavior have lower bids overall, but significantly higher
bids in public than in private. This result further supports our model’s claims that
in the absence of conformity effects, the effect of visibility on bidding should be
unconditionally positive owing to a desire for status seeking. However, given that
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bidders possessing no beliefs regarding group behavior have lower bids on average,
this would suggest that the average effect of conformity is to drive higher bidding
behavior overall, but to reduce positive deviations from the norm in public.
1.6.2.3 Norm Definition
While there is a large body of existing research in psychology that tests for the effects
of norms on individual behavior, some in this tradition would argue that self-reported
norms are problematic and that norm elicitation should be incentivized to remove
all possibility of bias from misreporting.
Krupka and Weber (2013) suggest an incentive compatible mechanism for norm
elicitation where the individual respondent is incentivized to provide a norm that is
closest to the actual prevailing social norm. This method would theoretically provide
greater external validity to the measurement of the social norm. However, Vesely
(2015) tests the difference between norms elicited with and without incentivization
and finds that the two methods are statistically equivalent and yield the same results.
My design is robust to these concerns insofar as our norm elicitation occurs before the
revelation of the study randomization. In fact, the participants have no knowledge
regarding the purpose of the study besides the sale of chlorine products at the point
at which norms are elicited. The nature of randomization and the randomization
assignment occur after the norm elicitation and therefore cannot bias our results in
a manner which is consistent with the treatment assignment and would therefore
compromise internal validity. This is moreover clear from Figure 4, which plots
the distribution of norms between the two treatment arms and shows that they are
identically distributed. Therefore, our results cannot be driven by any differences
arising from the norm elicitation process which is internally valid.
Moreover, the process of incentivizing norm elicitation has been proposed for the
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case of injunctive norms which inquire into the nature of what ’ought to be done’
and not descriptive norms that are utilized here. We address this concern in greater
detail in the robustness section.
1.6.3 Channels: Water Contamination Rates
During the information session bidders are also provided with rates of prevalence of
source and storage water contamination at the village level. We can therefore analyze
whether the degree of contamination in the environment mediates the behavioral
responses of individuals to our experimental treatments. We should expect for this
information to have an effect on individual behavior insofar as the degree to which
social utility can be derived from individual behavior is crucially tied to whether
society deems the action as favorable. Hence, in high contamination environments
it is likely that individual actions bear larger social utility rewards than in a low
contamination environment where individual preventative action is not deemed as
crucial.
Given the very high level of correlation between contamination at source and storage
(correlation coefficient of 0.73), and the smaller variance in degree of contamination
at the level of storage, I utilize the level of contamination at source in my estimation
strategy. I distinguish high contamination villages as having higher than median
levels of contamination at source and analyze individual bidding behavior between
the subsamples. In Appendix Table A6 we can see that high contamination villages
do differ from low contamination villages, so defined, along other parameters namely
number of household members, education level of the bidders and poverty rates.
However, merely taking SMT level fixed effects renders these differences statistically
insignificant and we therefore employ SMT level fixed effects in our analysis, as in our
other specifications, to control for the effects of these stable underlying differences.
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Table 1.8 (columns 1 & 2) revisits our base specification for the effect of high con-
tamination environments on the level of bids in public relative to private at the
conditional mean, and shows small and insignificant effects on overall bid levels. In
columns 3 and 4, we analyze the treatment effect on deviation from beliefs regarding
group behavior and find a large and statistically significant reduction of bids towards
the group bid among bidders who belong to high contamination environments, with
no such pattern in low contamination environment when estimated at the condi-
tional mean. This reduction in bids towards the expectation of group behavior is
nearly 40 percent of the mean difference between individual bids and beliefs regard-
ing the group bid, suggesting strong conformity influences in high contamination
environments.
In Table 1.9 we assess how these conformity influences vary across the distribution
of bidders in high and low contamination environments. As the coefficients indicate,
there are significant reductions in public bids relative to private bids throughout
the distribution in high contamination villages, in line with conformity, whereas low
contamination settings appear to no similar demonstration of conformity in public.
This is verified by our probit specification with strong evidence in favor of higher
bidding at the norm in high contamination environments and no parallel in low
contamination environments.
Finally, we assess whether there are differences in status seeking in our subsample
of bidders without beliefs regarding group behavior. Table 1.11 reveals that while
the individual coefficients are imprecisely estimated, the impact of public bidding on
bidders with no beliefs regarding group behavior is more positive in high contami-
nation settings that in low contamination settings. However, the standard errors on
these estimates are too large to be conclusive.
It would appear, therefore, that communities with higher levels of contamination
have a stronger tendency to converge towards group equilibria and potentially a
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stronger tendency to demonstrate status effects in the absence of conformity. Con-
sequently, we can surmise that the strength of social motivations is mediated by the
underlying demand environment, and people are less likely to exhibit social utility
from conformity if the behavior is not deemed imperative. Conversely, the negative
utility from being non-conformist in an environment where individual costs and ben-
efits are more uniformly distributed is larger and therefore people are more likely
to conform when contamination rates are uniformly higher than when they are low
and therefore incident asymmetrically across the population. However, the impact
of the demand environment on status signaling is not as clear cut, with imprecise
coefficients owing to small sample sizes.
1.6.4 Channels: Salience of Externalities
An additional layer of randomization that I introduced at the village level involved
the salience of externalities to the decision process. While the recognition of health
externalities is fairly high across the sample (roughly 88% of the sample acknowledge
that their actions affect health outcomes of others or that other’s actions affect their
health outcomes), in only half of the villages the information campaign included
a section highlighting the importance of health externalities in the group meeting.
Therefore, this arm allows us to investigate whether the priming bidders regarding
health externalities has an impact on bidding behavior in public relative to private.
In order to prevent information spillover between groups and contamination of the
randomization assignment, the randomization of externalities messaging was done at
village level and not the group level. Appendix Table A7 shows that randomization
at this level does not achieve balance between the treated and the untreated, with
significant differences emerging in the two groups in the level of contamination in
the environment and the gender mix of the bidders. I therefore control for these
differences in my analysis to ensure that they are no driving my results, while ac-
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knowledging that my identification at this level may not be completely robust to the
effects of unknown covariates. I add linear controls to my regressions for contami-
nation at source and storage and for the gender mix of the community group and
take other steps to ensure robustness of my results as elaborated below. In addition,
given that the visibility randomization is conducted at an individual level, compar-
ing public and private bidders within villages exposed to the externalities treatment
though compromising external validity is still internally valid.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.12 evaluate our base specification of the impact of
externalities messaging on the overall bid level. We can see that the coefficient
on public bidding in villages with externalities messaging is positive but statistically
insignificant when controls are added. However, a Wald test comparing the impact of
public bidding on bidders with and without externalities messaging reveals a weakly
statistically significant differences at the 10% level (F stat of 2.84, p value: 0.09).
In columns 3 and 4 we analyze the impact of externalities messaging on conformity.
The coefficients are imprecisely estimated but suggest departures between the two
treatment types, after controlling for differences in contamination and gender mix.
In Table 1.13 we find that looking at the differences in bidding behavior across the
bidding distribution, externalities do appear to be driving positive departures from
the beliefs regarding group behavior while environments with no externalities mes-
saging are demonstrating conformity by reducing the difference between public bids
and beliefs regarding the average group bid. A Wald test finds significant differences
between public bidding with and without externalities priming in 40th, 50th and 60th
percentiles of the distribution. The differences in public and private bidding within
villages with externalities priming show a similar pattern but are imprecisely mea-
sured and not statistically significantly disparate. While this specification contains
linear controls for contamination at source and storage and gender mix of meeting
group, I additionally control for whether the bidder lies in a high contamination
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village and for the interaction of high contamination and public bidding and for the
interaction of mixed gender groups and public bidding which are the two potential
sources of confounding effects (table not shown). Figure 8 plots both the coefficients
from the regression with and without the interacted controls and shows that the
patterns are not being driven by contamination as the coefficients remain virtually
stable in the villages with the externalities treatment and are positive for the vast
range of the bidding distribution but with large standard errors.
Table 1.14 shows similarly that the tendency to bid above the norm is not weak-
ened in villages with externalities messaging, as occurs in villages without. There
is a significantly higher probability of bidding on the beliefs regarding the norm in
externality villages but from our bidding distribution we can see that this is being
driven by bidders in the lower portion of the distribution raising their bids in public
as opposed to the conformity trend in the full sample of higher valuation bidders
lowering their bids.
Combined, these results point to a lack of conformity amongst individuals who are
exposed to the externalities priming message and vote in public. I argue that such
priming effectively translates into an increase in the pro-social value of individual
behavior, owing to the added consideration of health spillovers on the greater com-
munity. As a result, the relative contribution of status seeking to the image moti-
vation equation rises, and bids are not driven down in public from conformity. The
empirical evidence appears to bear out my theoretical stance and I find greater status
seeking behavior as individuals increase the disparity between their bids and their
expectations of average behavior in the group, leading to an overall increase in bids
in public with externalities priming relative to without where the mean effect was
(insignificantly) negative.
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1.6.5 Heterogeneous Effects: By Gender & Gender Compo-
sition of Reference Group
Studies in psychology indicate that while there isn’t complete consensus on gender
differences in conformity, in all studies where men and women’s responses to social
influences diverge, it is women who systematically exhibit greater conformity than
men. Furthermore, women are likely to conform more when they are aware that their
opinions will be shared publicly (Eagly, Wood and Fishbaugh(1981) and Eagly and
Chrvala (1986)). Santee and Jackson (1982) demonstrate that this arises from differ-
ent evaluative processes between men and women, whereby women favor conformity
over dissent as it relates to their self-identity.
There is significant heterogeneity in the gender composition of our meeting groups,
with some groups being single gender and others having a mixed gender composition,
which allows us to investigate whether there are different gender responses to our
social motivators of conformity and status seeking. However, since group compo-
sition is endogenously determined, these results are illustrative but should not be
interpreted as causal.
We look at the impact of public bidding on the disparity between individual bids
and perceptions regarding the group average in Table 1.15. We find extremely large
negative coefficients across most percentiles for all women groups, but they are im-
precisely estimated owing to small sample size for this subgroup. On the other hand,
the same coefficients among all male groups are considerably smaller except in the
largest quantiles. Figure 9 plots these coefficients. Finally, separating the trends
for men and women in mixed meetings, we find very small and insignificant coef-
ficients for men in mixed meetings, but large and statistically significant negative
coefficients across the majority of percentiles of the distribution for women (Figure
10). Consequently, we may conclude that women are more likely to bid closer to
35
their expectations of group behavior than men in public when in a mixed gender
environment. Single gender environments yield more ambiguous results of both men
and women demonstrating conformity over some range of the bidding distribution.
In addition, Table 1.16 indicates that women in all-female groups and women in
mixed groups display a lower likelihood of bidding above the norm in public - a
tendency that is nearly absent in all-male groups and weaker among males in mixed
group settings. However, these coefficients are not precisely estimated. Finally,
in Table 1.17, we find that men in all-male meetings who have no priors about
group behavior are significantly likely to raise their bids in public, in line with status
seeking in the absence of countervailing conformity motivations. Women in all female
meetings do not show this effect, wheres as women and men in mixed meeting bid
higher in public but the treatment response is more muted than for men in all-male
meetings.
These patterns indicate that our data does support the literature indicating women
exercise greater conformity than men and are more likely to bid closer to the de-
scriptive norm when their actions are observable, though this result is derived from
mixed gender settings and not from single gender settings where men also display
conformity across some range of the bidding distribution. There is also evidence for
men exercising greater status seeking in all-male environments from the sub-sample
that has no prior beliefs over group behavior. However, these results are suggestive
and not causally identified owing to endogenous group formation.
1.6.6 Public vs. Private bidding (Self-selection arm):
Our third treatment arm allows us to assess how social motivations operate when
people are allowed to self-select their bidding environment. This is an important out-
come insofar as it is the closest approximation of a unregulated equilibrium which
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will conceivably emerge when product purchase does not occur in a controlled envi-
ronment. Hence, when there are alternate channels by which to procure the product,
as would be the case if this product was available in the local market place, we would
likely see a self-selection equilibrium emerge in group setting.
The ability to self-select into private or public bidding reveals that there is an overall
utility gain from bidding in private with 61% of the self-selection sample choosing to
keep their bids private.
Table 1.18 parses out the impact of sorting on each arm – opting into private versus
opting into public, in an extension of our base regression specification:
MWTPim = α+β1Publicim+β2Opt∗Privateim+β3Opt∗Publicim+Xim+fe+ εim
Here, we see clearly the impact of sorting on maximum willingness to pay as elicited
by the BDM bid. While random assignment to public bidding doesn’t result in a
change in public bids relative to private bids overall, self-selection into private bidding
results in a reduction in the level of private bids relative to randomly assigned private
bids. Moreover, self-selection into public bidding results in a substantial increase in
the level of public bids, relative to random assignment to public/private bids, such
that the disparity of bids between public and private bidding with self-selection is
large.
It is important to recognize that these results can emerge from a simple sorting of
bidders with higher valuations into public bidding and lower valuations into private
bidding. Or it may be the case that the choice mechanism itself affects bidders’
underlying valuations. Our data does not allow up to make any predictions about
which possibility is driving our results.
In Table 1.19, we apply our conformity specification to the self-selection sample
and find that there is no evidence for conformity among the subset of the sample
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that chooses to bid in public. Hence, while bidders randomized into public bidding
are lowering their bids in public towards their conception of the social norm, those
selecting into public bidding are raising their bids in public and deviating from the
social norm across the majority of the deciles. Therefore, we argue that conformity
influences diminish when self-selection is allowed. However, our design does not allow
us to distinguish whether this occurs as a result of conformists sorting out of public
or whether the same individuals tap into different motivations to order their behavior
when the mechanism is altered or high valuation types are inclined to bid in public.
However, it does reveal a potential mechanism for eliciting higher bids in public and
therefore generating more positive beliefs regarding average group behavior, since
self-selection into public bidding results in a higher average bid level in public.
1.6.7 Robustness
I test an arguably more exogenous definition of the descriptive norm in our data by
using the median expectation regarding the average group bid at the village level as
a measure of the social norm, as opposed to using the self-reported measure.
In Appendix Table A2 (Figure 12) I test our conformity specification using this alter-
nate definition of the norm. The coefficients are attenuated owing to measurement
error but show the same patterns in the 30-50th percentiles as the base specification
with individual beliefs, lending credence to our earlier results. This specification re-
inforces our belief that the conformity results are being driven by a conception of the
social norm and not some arbitrary or endogenously formed beliefs of the treatment
group.
A bigger concern may be that since people’s beliefs regarding group behavior were not
exogenously manipulated, there may be endogeneity in who professes to having no
priors over group behavior which will affect my ability to generalize the results from
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the subsample of bidders professing to having no beliefs regarding group behavior.
However, randomization yields balance between the treatment arms on expectations
regarding the average bid as well as the proportion of bidders who professed to
not knowing the norm. I would argue, therefore, that the characteristics of this
subsample, which is of significant size at roughly 20% of the full sample, are also
randomly distributed and do not vary systematically. I also regress the propensity
to express no expectations regarding group behavior on a battery of variables that
were employed for ensuring randomization balance (Appendix Table A4). I find
no significant coefficients except for ’Age of group’ which suggests that people who
express no knowledge of group behavior are less likely to belong to groups who have
had a longer history of association. However, independently I have found this feature
of groups to bias against finding treatment effects from status motivation. Therefore,
the shorter period of association among the ’No Norm’ subsample would bias against
finding treatment effects. (results not shown).
My alternate norm definition also allows me to corroborate the results for the sub-
sample with no beliefs regarding the norm. In Appendix Table A3 (Figure 14) I
assess how the bid of bidders in the NoNorm subsample changes relative to the
village level norm construct.
Since the mass of bidders with no expectations regarding the norm are bidding
lower than the village level norm, the coefficients in quantiles 10-30 reflect movement
towards the norm and can be consistent with both status seeking and conformity
influences. However, the positive departure from the norm as indicated in quartiles
40-60 can only be reconciled with status seeking, and taken as a whole suggests a
linear increase in bids for the vast majority of the sample in public which is consistent
with status seeking behavior. Hence, while our results are not conclusive, it would
appear that they are more supportive of status seeking than conformity, when people
state an absence of beliefs regarding group behavior.
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1.6.8 Discussion
My results indicate that while social motivation does influence willingness to pay for
health products in social settings, the strength of these motivations is inherently tied
to expectations regarding group behavior. Utility for status seekers is increasing in
differentiating yourself from the average group behavior, but the demands of con-
formism operate in the reverse direction when expectations regarding group behavior
are low. Given that the largest proportion of my sample has low expectations regard-
ing the average bid, status seeking effects are dominated by a desire to conform in
public, particularly in the portion of the bidding distribution where bids are already
proximate to the beliefs regarding the group norm.
The fact that conformism would exhibit itself as a negative rebound in this situation
may appear somewhat puzzling given that health expenditures in general have a
positive norm associated with them and to lower willingness to pay in public appears
counterintuitive. However, given that these social groups potentially form a platform
for informal insurance, individual behavior is also subject to the incentives of income
hiding. Hence, in settings characterized by high amounts of interpersonal transfers
and income observability, agents are found to demonstrate a preference for hiding
their wealth in order to avoid the demands of risk sharing (Beekman et al., 2015,
Jakiela and Ozier, 2015). Our particular setting, by making public an individual’s
willingness to pay may also be providing information to their social insurance network
on their ability to insure others against risk. Therefore, agents may be more averse
to bidding higher in public and more amenable to conforming to a low bidding norm
because they are less inclined to demonstrate their own wealth.
Status seeking only emerges neatly for the subsample that has no expectations regard-
ing group behavior and is therefore unconstrained by conformity influences. More-
over, our externalities treatment suggests that status seeking is increasing in the
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pro-social value of actions, with messaging regarding health externalities resulting
in status seeking behavior where bids are higher in public and bidders differentiate
themselves from their expectations regarding group behavior in a positive direction
by placing higher bids in public. This suggests, therefore, that when health seeking
behavior is not explicitly perceived as a ’social’ behavior, individuals are more likely
to appeal to social norm considerations and align themselves with average group
behavior in public. However, when individual behavior is perceived as having social
repercussion, people are more likely to engage in more socially desirable behavior and
demonstrate higher willingness to pay in public since status seeking considerations
are heightened.
I also find that when bidders can select their own bidding environment, the tendency
towards conformity in public bidding disappear. Instead, public bidders throughout
the bidding distribution demonstrate status seeking behavior, placing significantly
higher bids than their expectations regarding the average bid in the group. On the
other hand, bidders self-selecting into private bidding demonstrate lowering bidding
on average and similar patterns of conformity as the randomized sample of public
bidders. I argue, therefore, that self-selection draws bidders with a preference for
conformity into private bidding allowing stronger status seeking patterns to emerge
in the bidders who select into public bidding and seek to derive positive signals from
their public behavior. However, this pattern can also emerge from higher valuation
bidders selecting into public bidding while lower valuation bidders do not. While I
cannot make any claims as to the mechanism that elicits such behavior, self-selection
reveals itself as a potential method by which we can generate more positive beliefs




One of the three guiding pillars of the World Development Report 2015 is ’Thinking
socially’ - the recognition that individual decision making is framed by social norms,
preferences, identities and networks. My work attempts to shed light on how these
social preferences can affect individual investment in health care, and whether these
social preferences can be applied towards the end of using community groups as
treatment units for public health interventions.
My research highlights the importance of exploring and accounting for preexisting
beliefs regarding social norms in any policy setting that involves the use of social mo-
tivation. Hence, if on average people have low expectations regarding the norm, and
exhibit strong preferences for conformity, social preferences can work to the detriment
of initiatives geared towards improving individual outcomes. Consequently, there is
a strong need to assess the prevailing norm and to modify the norm as appropriate
towards the goals of policy before using social preferences towards improving policy
outcomes.
This finding resonates with Ray’s (1998) theory of development traps arising from
adoption complementarities which can yield multiple dynamic adoption equilibria,
some in which adoption is high and other where adoption is low. In our particu-
lar setting, these complementarities are generated by conformity to the social norm
governing willingness to invest in technology and hence where norms are poor, con-
formity to the norm reinforces poor adoption beliefs and yields a poor adoption
equilibrium. It stands to reason that strong social norms governing willingness to
pay would serve to reinforce a commensurately high adoption equilibrium, if such
norm can be generated.
This suggests the need for research on the evolution of norms and the possibility
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and effectiveness of policies for changing prevailing norms. Our self-selection arm
points towards a mechanism that can contribute to the evolution of stronger positive
norms because it encourages the display of status seeking behavior and privatizes
behavior that would, in public, weaken the norm. On the other hand, it leads to
an overall diminishment in the willingness to pay since more people seek private
transactions than public and lower their willingness to pay when provided with the
veil of privacy. Hence, policy makers should pay heed to the choice of mechanisms
for eliciting behavior as much as the behavior itself.
Methodologically, we are able to exploit large sample size in a unique setting of pre-
existing community groups and therefore provide more realistic estimates for peer
effects than synthetically created peer groups with small sample sizes. We are able
to randomize treatments within groups to allow us to tackle the reflection problem in
group treatments. In addition the problem of correlated effects within groups would
bias us against finding treatment effects. However, owing to constraints of our study
setting, we are unable to randomize people’s beliefs regarding the group norm, which
would have allowed us more compelling evidence regarding conformity effects.
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of Bid data
Note: SMT is sub-district administrative unit. Field teams were organized by SMT and I employ SMT level fixed
effects in the regressions to improve estimate precision
Figure 1.2: Distribution of Bid data against Expectations regarding Average Bid
Note: This figure plots the distribution of actual bidding data against the distribution of beliefs regarding the average
bid in the group. Ranksum tests reveal that the belief distribution is dominated in rank by the distribution of actual
bids
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of Bid data against Expectations regarding Average Bid
Note: This figure plots the belief regarding the average bid in the group for every decile of the bidding distribution.
It reveals a stability of beliefs across different ranges of actual bidding behavior
Figure 1.4: Distribution of Expectations regarding Average Bid by Treatment Group
Note: This figure plots the distribution of belief regarding the average bid in the group by treatment arm, showing
that beliefs are exogenous to treatment assignment
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of DevNorm by Treatment Group
Note: This figure plots the distribution of DevNorm - the deviation of individual bid from belief re. average bid in
group- by treatment arm, showing the shift in the public distribution left in the direction of decreasing deviation
from the beliefs
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Figure 1.6: Testing for Conformity: Full Sample
Note: This figure plots the coefficients by decile of the treatment effect in public on DevNorm - the deviation of
individual bid from belief re. average bid in group, showing the tendency to reduce deviation from beliefs regarding
group behavior in public
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Figure 1.7: Testing for Conformity: Contamination
Note: This figure plots the coefficients by decile of the treatment effect in public on DevNorm - the deviation of
individual bid from belief re. average bid in group - for individuals in villages with above median contamination
levels against individuals from median or below contamination
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Figure 1.8: Testing for Conformity: Externalities
Note: This figure plots the coefficients by decile of the treatment effect in public on DevNorm - the deviation of
individual bid from belief re. average bid in group - for individuals drawn from villages with externalities priming
against individuals without priming. The control specifications include controls for gender of meeting group and
contamination interacted with treatment
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Figure 1.9: Testing for Conformity: Gender
Note: This figure plots the coefficients by decile of the treatment effect in public on DevNorm - the deviation of
individual bid from belief re. average bid in group - for individuals drawn from all-female groups against individuals
from all-male groups, showing that women adhere more closely to the full sample pattern of conformity but men also
display some conformity at the higher end of the distribution (noisy estimates)
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Figure 1.10: Testing for Conformity: Gender
Note: This figure plots the coefficients by decile of the treatment effect in public on DevNorm - the deviation of
individual bid from belief re. average bid in group - for female against males, who are drawn from mixed groups
showing that women in mixed groups demonstrate conformity while men do not
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Figure 1.11: Testing for Conformity: Self Selection
Note: This figure plots the coefficients by decile of the treatment effect in public on DevNorm - the deviation of
individual bid from belief re. average bid in group - for randomized public bidders against self-select public bidders
showing that self-select public bidders do not exercise conformity, instead exhibiting status seeking behavior that
increases their deviation from
group behavior
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Figure 1.12: Testing for Conformity: Robustness
Note: This figure plots the coefficients by decile of the treatment effect in public on DevNorm against the coefficients
using the village level measure for DevNorm, showing that the patterns of conformity in bidding behavior are robust
to our choice of belief measures
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Figure 1.13: Testing for Status Seeking: Robustness
Note: This figure plots the coefficients by decile of the treatment effect in public on the NoNorm subsample relative
to the village level measure for DevNorm, showing that this subsample shows a unique pattern of bidding relative to
the village construct for beliefs which is more consistent with status seeking than conformity
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Table 1.1: Public Bidding - ATE in Randomized Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Maximum Willingness to Pay
Public Bid 0.585 0.193 -0.747
(2.197) (2.218) (2.301)
_cons 106.6*** 106.8*** 96.85***
(3.330) (3.149) (7.899)
N 1892 1892 1806
Mean Dependent Var (Pvt Bid) 106.6 106.6 106.2
Fixed effects None SMT SMT
Controls No No Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the individual’s Maximum Willingness
to Pay for the product, as elicited by their BDM bid.
Controls: Age, educ, poverty, gender, HH size, no. of children
Standard errors clustered at meeting level
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.2: Simultaneous Quantile Regression of Maximum Willingness to Pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Maximum Willingness to Pay
Quantile Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
Public bid 5.677** 1.709 -1.346 -2.477 -2.40e-14 2.37e-14 -3.643 -2.613 -2.471
(2.641) (3.497) (2.211) (3.634) (0.770) (0.805) (3.667) (4.959) (4.055)
_cons 24.81** 56.91*** 92.02*** 109.1*** 150.0*** 150.0*** 152.8*** 167.9*** 196.2***
(11.54) (13.68) (8.212) (9.420) (8.348) (4.099) (10.43) (11.03) (8.842)
N 1806 1806 1806 1806 1806 1806 1806 1806 1806
MDepVar 27.08 56.64 75.94 95.62 114.6 114.6 134.7 155.9 177.5
FixedEffect SMT
Controls Age, education, poverty status, gender, household size and number of children
Notes: Dependent variable is the individual bid (MWTP_im). Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
MDepVar reflects the mean bid in the private bidding arm
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.3: DevNorm - ATE in Randomized Sample
(1) (2) (3)
DevNormim = MWTPim −BidNormim
Public Bid -0.578 -0.781 -2.078
(2.789) (2.804) (2.915)
_cons 26.74*** 26.85*** 11.78
(3.416) (3.362) (8.962)
N 1534 1534 1456
Mean Dependent Var (Private Bid) 26.74 26.74 26.90
Fixed effects None SMT SMT
Controls No No Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the deviation of individual bid from the individual’s
belief regarding the average bid in the group (DevNorm = MWTP - BidNorm)
Controls: Age, educ, poverty, gender, HH size, no. of children
Standard errors clustered at meeting level
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.4: Simultaneous Quantile Regression of Difference between Own Bid and Average Bid (DevNorm)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DevNorm
Quantile Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
Public bid 0.448 -2.688 -8.444** -8.006** -6.670** -6.024 -1.827 1.690 2.639
(7.891) (3.744) (3.770) (3.184) (3.276) (4.245) (4.841) (3.873) (5.924)
_cons -63.79*** -21.98** 12.74 36.36** 39.49*** 52.46*** 60.26*** 78.93*** 97.42***
(22.22) (10.93) (17.68) (15.48) (12.26) (9.444) (10.46) (11.35) (11.00)
N 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456
MDepVar -82.23 -18.66 5.16 18.34 29.13 42.74 56.02 73.5 101.1
FixedEffect SMT
Controls Age, education, poverty status, gender, household size and number of children
Notes: The dependent variable is the difference between the individual bid (MWTP_im) and the individual’s
belief regarding the average group bid (BidNorm_im). Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: Difference between Bid and Beliefs re. Average Bid
Private Public Total
% % %
Below Norm 24.5 25.9 25.2
At Norm 10.2 14 12.1
Above Norm 65.3 60.2 62.6
Total 100 100 100
Note: This table reflects the proportion of the sample that bids above, on or
below their expectations re. the average bid, and differences in these
proportions by treatment condition
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Table 1.6: Probability of Bidding Higher than BidNorm
(1) (2) (3)
Pr(MWTP > BidNorm) Pr(MWTP = BidNorm) Pr(MWTP < BidNorm)
Public Bid -0.155*** 0.162** 0.0824***
(0.0436) (0.0677) (0.0209)
_cons 0.162 -1.311*** -0.353***
(0.114) (0.200) (0.0497)
N 1456 1456 1456
Mean Dep Var (Pvt) 0.648 0.104 0.248
Fixed Effects SMT
Controls Age, educ, poverty, gender, hh size and num child
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating whether the bidder bid above their expectation
regarding the average bid in the group, equal to the average or below it
Standard errors are clustered at the meeting level
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
63












Mean Dep Var (Pvt) 109.1
Fixed Effects SMT
Controls Age, educ, poverty, gender, hh size and num child
Note: The dependent variable is the individual’s Maximum Willingness to Pay
for the product, as elicited by their BDM bid.
Standard errors are clustered at the meeting level
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.8: Channels: Contamination - ATE of Public Bidding
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Max WTP DevNorm
Public Bid (Low Contamination) 2.441 0.594 3.514 2.551
(3.078) (3.263) (3.649) (3.906)
High Contamination -10.77* 2.554 -8.750 1.604
(6.345) (6.855) (7.017) (7.750)
Public Bid * High Contamination -4.942 -3.378 -10.82* -11.41**
(4.232) (4.423) (5.582) (5.688)
_cons 110.8*** 95.55*** 30.22*** 10.91
(4.534) (9.419) (4.236) (10.13)
N 1892 1806 1534 1456
Mean Dep Var (Private Bid) 106.6 106.3 26.74 26.90
Fixed effects None SMT None SMT
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The dependent variable in col 1 and 2 is the individual Maximum Willingness
to Pay for the product, as elicited by their BDM bid. In col 3 and 4, the dependent
is the deviation of individual bid from expectation regarding average group bid
Standard errors clustered at meeting level
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.9: Channels- Contamination and Conformity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DevNorm
Quantile Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
Public Bid -1.034 2.582 0.450 -1.056 5.220 3.076 2.198 6.130 5.511
(8.045) (4.122) (5.940) (4.130) (3.649) (5.277) (6.281) (4.885) (7.829)
High Cont. -9.037 8.549 10.59* 8.250** 7.971 6.318 1.627 -0.177 -0.0757
(10.37) (8.199) (5.575) (3.506) (4.916) (5.559) (5.375) (9.301) (10.17)
Pub*HighCont. 3.570 -15.29 -12.70* -12.19** -23.18*** -17.81** -10.13 -12.37 -14.29
(14.18) (10.08) (7.417) (4.784) (5.919) (7.681) (10.12) (10.60) (14.00)
_cons -63.56*** -27.07*** 0.990 26.26*** 32.51*** 51.41*** 58.66*** 78.48*** 94.12***
(20.19) (10.45) (12.26) (9.576) (7.007) (7.622) (8.823) (10.42) (13.16)
N 1456
MeanDepVar -48.84 -21.18 -1.822 14.61 23.64 37.13 53.47 71.43 99.75
Fixed Effects SMT
Controls Age, education, poverty status, gender, household size and number of children
Notes: The dependent variable is the difference between the individual bid and the individual’s belief regarding
the average group bid (BidNorm_im). High contamination villages have source contamination greater than the
median across the full sample. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis.
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.10: Contamination and Probability of Bidding Higher than BidNorm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pr (MWTP > BidNorm) Pr (MWTP = BidNorm)
High Cont Low Cont High Cont Low Cont
Public Bid -0.419*** 0.0198 0.309*** 0.0401
(0.0345) (0.0197) (0.0921) (0.0460)
_cons -0.245 0.286* -0.995*** -1.457***
(0.218) (0.158) (0.199) (0.213)
N 591 865 591 865
Mean Dep Var (Private Bid) 0.647 0.649 0.107 0.100
Fixed Effects SMT
Controls Age, educ, poverty, gender, hh size and num child
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating whether the bidder bid above
their expectation regarding the average bid in the group or on their expectation. Standard
errors are clustered at the meeting level
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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No Norm*High Contamination 8.637
(11.44)





Mean Dep Var (Private Bid) 109.1
Fixed Effects SMT
Controls Age, educ, poverty, gender, hh size & # child
Note: The dependent variable is the individual’s Maximum Willingness to Pay for the
product as elicited by their BDM bid. Standard errors are clustered at meeting level
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.12: ATE of Public Bidding by Externalities Priming
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Max WTP DevNorm
Public Bid (No Externalities Priming) -2.994 -4.371 -3.552 -5.258
(2.758) (2.961) (3.803) (4.070)
Externalities Priming -0.922 -5.074 2.627 -1.132
(6.615) (6.285) (6.784) (6.617)
Public Bid * Externalities 7.304* 7.317 5.995 6.340
(4.413) (4.660) (5.642) (5.923)
_cons 107.0*** 88.94*** 25.52*** 5.127
(4.487) (19.73) (4.761) (19.56)
N 1892 1806 1534 1456
Mean Dep Var (Private Bid) 106.6 106.3 26.74 26.90
Fixed effects None SMT None SMT
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The dependent variable in col 1 and 2 is the individual Maximum Willingness
to Pay for the product, as elicited by their BDM bid. In col 3 and 4, the dependent
is the deviation of individual bid from expectation regarding average group bid
Standard errors clustered at meeting level
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.13: Externalities and Conformity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DevNorm
Quantile Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
Public Bid -7.574 -7.413 -8.264 -9.962*** -10.69** -9.839* -4.855 -2.846 6.900
(7.198) (7.958) (5.189) (3.291) (4.590) (5.265) (5.537) (7.635) (8.786)
Externalities -9.585 -5.310 -1.451 -3.117 -8.686** -5.346 2.730 2.678 10.29
(9.951) (6.768) (5.644) (4.017) (4.009) (4.988) (4.534) (4.973) (8.172)
Pub*Externality 17.30 10.35 5.283 5.912 10.69* 12.01 5.938 3.750 -11.57
(10.75) (10.10) (7.581) (5.015) (5.940) (7.619) (8.264) (8.717) (10.25)
_cons -44.78** -28.83** -2.747 15.02 42.30*** 43.54*** 45.71*** 66.76*** 86.49***
(22.09) (12.14) (12.83) (16.13) (15.42) (15.31) (16.64) (13.58) (22.78)
N 1456
MnDepVar-Pvt -43.07 -15.7 3.86 18.81 30.82 44.39 57.92 76.16 99.03
Fixed Effects SMT
Controls Age, educ, poverty, gender, hhold size, num child, source+storage contamination, group gender
Notes: The dependent variable is the difference between the individual bid and the individual’s belief regarding
the average group bid (BidNorm_im). High contamination villages have source contamination greater than the
median across the full sample. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis.
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.14: Externalities Priming and Probability of Bidding Higher than BidNorm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pr (MWTP > BidNorm) Pr (MWTP = BidNorm)
Externalities No Externalities Externalities No Externalities
Public Bid -0.0244 -0.281** 0.163** 0.177
(0.0930) (0.134) (0.0662) (0.121)
_cons 0.0288 -0.103 -2.144*** -1.222***
(0.870) (0.180) (0.135) (0.441)
N 691 765 691 767
Mean Dep Var (Private Bid) 0.637 0.657 0.103 0.103
Fixed Effects SMT
Controls Age, educ, poverty, gender, hh size, num child, contamination, group gender
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable on whether the bidder bid above their expectation
regarding the average bid in the group or on their expectation. Standard errors are clustered at the
meeting level. Externality villages are primed with a message on spillovers of individual health behavior.
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.15: Gender and Conformity-I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DevNorm
A- All Female Group
Quantile Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
Public Bid -5.988 -19.23 -14.47 -12.11 -15.22 -14.81* -13.64* 1.339 0.448
(22.24) (11.81) (10.23) (9.731) (10.94) (8.067) (7.723) (6.046) (17.92)
N 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
MeanDepVar(Pvt) -42.71 -3.8 8.79 18.78 35.28 48.13 61.89 69.57 90.05
B- All Male Group
Quantile Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
Public Bid 7.430 4.291 -3.697 -6.913 -2.297 -5.774 -9.756 -14.67 -10.20
(12.71) (10.35) (10.04) (8.293) (6.760) (8.788) (9.189) (10.46) (10.34)
N 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320
MeanDepVar (Pvt) -62.22 -32.67 -10.7 5.413 20.06 39.33 56.69 81.33 104.95
Fixed Effects SMT
Controls Age, education, poverty status, gender, household size and number of children
Notes: The dependent variable is the difference between the individual bid (MWTP_im) and the individual’s
belief re. the average group bid (BidNorm_im). Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
medskip
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Table 1.16: Gender and Conformity-II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DevNorm
B- Mixed Group
Quantile Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
Public Bid -17.13 -4.038 -8.02e-14 -1.40e-13 0.936 5.160 4.298 -1.585 -3.157
(16.27) (6.504) (7.464) (5.332) (5.804) (5.879) (8.194) (10.30) (10.77)
Public* Female Bid 20.04 -1.025 -10.000 -10.000** -10.78* -15.06** -7.513 5.862 11.78
(18.91) (10.49) (10.59) (4.994) (6.275) (7.596) (10.49) (12.03) (13.46)
N 968 968 968 968 968 968 968 968 968
MeanDepVar (Pvt) -34.65 -17.59 4.659 14.85 26.31 36.58 52.81 77.42 107
Fixed Effects SMT
Controls Age, education, poverty status, gender, household size and number of children
Notes: The dependent variable is the difference between the individual bid (MWTP_im) and the individual’s
belief re. the average group bid (BidNorm_im). Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
medskip
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Table 1.17: Probability of Bidding Higher than BidNorm- Gender
(1) (2)
Pr (MWTP > BidNorm)
All Female Group All Male Group Mixed Group




Public * Female Bid -0.127
(0.157)
_cons 0.253 -0.0144 0.612**
(0.634) (0.362) (0.243)
N 168 320 968
Mean Dep Var (Private Bid) 0.650 0.572 0.674
Fixed Effects SMT
Controls Age, educ, poverty, gender, hh size and num child
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating whether the
bidder bid above their expectation regarding the average bid in the group
Standard errors are clustered at the meeting level
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.18: No Conformity SubSample -Gender
(1) (2) (3)
Max WTP
All Female Group All Male Group Mixed Group
Public Bid -5.814 0.323 -7.869
(6.763) (5.898) (5.141)
No Norm 7.078 -7.747 -28.35**
(13.17) (13.13) (11.99)




_cons 106.4*** 101.6*** 102.3***
(17.46) (16.68) (10.05)
N 226 384 1196
Mean Dep Var (Private Bid) 103.5 101.7 112.6
Fixed Effects SMT
Controls Age, educ, poverty, gender, hh size and num child
Note: The dependent variable is the individual’s Maximum Willingness to Pay for
the product, as elicited by their BDM bid.
Standard errors are clustered at the meeting level
Some interactions suppressed for space consideration
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.19: Public Bidding - ATE on Randomized and Self Selection Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Maximum Willingness to Pay
Public Bid 0.585 0.211 -0.853
(2.197) (2.212) (2.295)
Self Selected Private Bid -3.732 -5.777** -5.488*
(2.828) (2.909) (2.916)
Self Selected Public Bid 4.253 9.767** 9.300**
(4.569) (4.334) (4.325)
_cons 106.6*** 106.7*** 96.01***
(3.331) (3.153) (7.119)
N 2851 2851 2723
Mean Dep Var (Private Bid) 106.6 106.6 106.2
Fixed effects None SMT SMT
Controls No No Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the individual’s Maximum Willingness to Pay
for the product, as elicited by their BDM bid.
Standard errors clustered at meeting level
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.20: Self Selection and Conformity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DevNorm
Quantile Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
Public Bid 0.609 -1.242 -6.995* -7.556** -6.474** -5.025 -3.130 0.998 1.295
(5.632) (4.233) (3.883) (3.229) (3.247) (4.267) (4.793) (4.818) (5.184)
SelfSlct*Pvt 0.0237 -6.123 -11.76*** -10.85*** -6.605*** -6.292** -8.961** -6.874 -2.049
(7.696) (5.326) (3.766) (2.504) (2.550) (3.150) (3.614) (5.099) (5.198)
SelfSlct*Pub 11.64 14.91* 17.01** 15.54*** 14.63** 15.31** 18.32*** 11.23* 6.749
(10.90) (8.337) (6.728) (4.838) (6.243) (7.507) (6.695) (6.532) (6.545)
_cons -51.77*** -20.45** 7.914 24.96*** 34.57*** 52.70*** 62.82*** 82.12*** 91.76***
(11.06) (9.974) (7.786) (8.366) (7.599) (6.159) (8.310) (10.12) (10.61)
N 2195 2195 2195 2195 2195 2195 2195 2195 2195
MDepVar -49.49 -19.12 2.58 15.91 28.58 42.72 55.58 73.26 102.5
FxedEffect SMT
Controls Age, education, poverty status, gender, household size and number of children
Notes: The dependent variable is the difference between the individual bid (MWTP_im) and the individual’s
belief regarding the average group bid (BidNorm_im).
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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1.9 Appendices
Table A1: Balance Across Treatment Arms
Private Public Self-select p-value (joint)
Female 0.531 0.515 0.523 0.790
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Education (years) 1.377 1.749 1.619 0.079
(0.111) (0.125) (0.115)
Number of Household Members 7.766 7.961 7.920 0.503
(0.119) (0.125) (0.124)
Number of children 0-2 years 0.586 0.637 0.587 0.341
(0.026) (0.030) (0.028)
Head of Household 0.725 0.713 0.713 0.773
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Poverty Score 23.508 24.193 23.723 0.530
(0.453) (0.445) (0.422)
Leader 0.124 0.139 0.130 0.645
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
All Female meeting group 0.192 0.207 0.219 0.336
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Mixed meeting group 0.474 0.460 0.438 0.299
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Village level contamination rate 7.550 7.496 7.578 0.589
(0.059) (0.058) (0.056)
Number of meeting members 15.586 15.650 15.548 0.986
(0.439) (0.443) (0.440)
Expectation re. average group bid 82.973 81.508 80.760 0.484
(1.360) (1.306) (1.260)
No expectations re. group bid 0.199 0.197 0.199 0.989
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Small Household (<= 5 members) 0.261 0.244 0.247 0.641
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
78
Table A2: Simultaneous Quantile Regression of Diff between Own Bid and Average Bid (DevNorm_Village)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DevNorm_Village
Quantile Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
Public bid -2.707 -3.608 -5.169** -5.613** -4.439 -2.513 -1.384 0.133 -5.365
(4.762) (4.059) (2.515) (2.718) (3.316) (2.835) (3.310) (4.210) (5.236)
_cons -58.19*** -14.18 13.19 25.16** 46.41*** 56.95*** 57.62*** 70.21*** 109.4***
(10.24) (13.13) (11.34) (9.998) (8.667) (6.780) (10.93) (12.78) (16.79)
N 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456
MeanDepVar -44.87 -15.97 3.129 16.41 29.43 40.49 51.78 71.63 99.31
Fixed Effect SMT
Controls Age, education, poverty status, gender, household size and number of children
Notes: The dependent variable is the difference between the individual bid (MWTP_im) and the village
level median of individual beliefs regarding the average group bid Median_v(BidNorm_im).
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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Table A3: Simultaneous Quantile Regression of Diff between Own Bid and Average Bid (DevNorm_Village)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DevNorm_Village
Quantile Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
Public bid 26.22*** 8.572 11.21 12.05 21.00** 15.61 2.085 -0.650 -7.008
(9.978) (7.367) (9.467) (10.15) (8.270) (11.24) (10.73) (8.842) (7.089)
_cons -46.17* -34.31 -21.96 4.404 -1.563 24.25 60.52* 106.0*** 113.6***
(26.10) (30.92) (31.69) (31.22) (30.83) (33.60) (35.83) (32.24) (24.91)
N 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350
MeanDepVar -74.51 -39.59 -24.04 -4.2 6.87 26.38 50.4 69.78 93.62
Fixed Effects SMT
Controls Age, education, poverty status, gender, household size and number of children
Notes: The dependent variable is the difference between the individual bid (MWTP_im) and the village
level median of individual beliefs regarding the average group bid Median_v(BidNorm_im).
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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Number of HH members -0.00227
(0.00288)






All male meeting group 0.0126
(0.0628)
Mixed meeting group -0.00992
(0.0524)




Age of group -0.0231*
(0.0133)




Standard errors clustered at meeting level
∗p < 0.10 ∗ ∗p < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
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Table A6: Balance Across High and Low Contamination Villages
Public Public p-value p-val
High Cont Low Cont w. fe
Female 0.491 0.556 0.118
(0.020) (0.026)
Education (years) 2.210 1.024 0.000 0.418
(0.179) (0.152)
Num of Household Members 7.651 8.455 0.004 0.456
(0.152) (0.211)
Num of children 0-2 years 0.611 0.697 0.126
(0.040) (0.044)
Head of Household 0.689 0.750 0.110
(0.019) (0.022)
Poverty Score 25.876 21.524 0.000 0.807
(0.604) (0.612)
Leader 0.148 0.125 0.383
(0.015) (0.017)
All Male meeting group 0.215 0.237 0.648
(0.017) (0.022)
All Female meeting group 0.135 0.109 0.495
(0.014) (0.016)
Mixed meeting group 0.651 0.654 0.920
(0.019) (0.025)
Village level contamination rate 2.602 6.795 0.000
(0.049) (0.065)
High Contamination village 6.572 8.984 0.000
(0.067) (0.040)
Age of community group 82.208 80.342 0.764
(1.532) (2.332)
Number of meeting members 0.191 0.184 0.946
(0.016) (0.020)
Expectation re. ave group bid 0.265 0.215 0.182
(0.018) (0.021)
No expectations re. group bid 0.000 0.886 0.000 0.347
(0.000) (0.016)
Small Hhold (<=5 members) 0.604 0.609 0.590
(0.020) (0.025)
Low Know of Water Treatment 0.615 0.601 0.571
(0.016) (0.016)
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Table A7: Balance Across Villages with and without Externalities Priming
Public Public p-value p-val
No Ext Ext w. fe
Female 0.573 0.456 0.001 0.646
(0.022) (0.023)
Education (years) 1.687 1.794 0.232
(0.178) (0.176)
Num of Household Members 7.926 7.996 0.722
(0.172) (0.180)
Num of children 0-2 years 0.630 0.658 0.340
(0.039) (0.046)
Head of Household 0.700 0.725 0.640
(0.021) (0.020)
Poverty Score 23.378 24.954 0.127
(0.581) (0.671)
Leader 0.137 0.142 0.641
(0.015) (0.016)
All Male meeting group 0.167 0.281 0.000 0.257
(0.017) (0.021)
All Female meeting group 0.087 0.165 0.001 0.003
(0.013) (0.017)
Mixed meeting group 0.746 0.554 0.000 0.003
(0.020) (0.023)
Village level contamination rate 4.449 3.975 0.006 0.126
(0.101) (0.114)
High Contamination village 7.970 7.015 0.000 0.326
(0.075) (0.083)
Age of community group 81.744 81.212 0.960
(1.869) (1.811)
Number of meeting members 0.181 0.196 0.833
(0.017) (0.018)
Expectation re. ave group bid 0.256 0.235 0.614
(0.020) (0.019)
No expectations re. group bid 0.348 0.333 0.778
(0.021) (0.022)
Small Hhold (<=5 members) 0.644 0.567 0.027 0.241
(0.022) (0.023)




The Impact of Sequential Decision Making on the
Willingness to Pay for Preventative Health Care
2.1 Abstract
Using data from a randomized field experiment in the setting of community groups
in rural Pakistan, we test whether sequential decision making affects individual will-
ingness to pay for preventative health care products by harnessing incentives to lead
by example. Overall, we find little evidence of individuals demonstrating higher will-
ingness to pay when randomized into leadership. However, when groups are primed
on the externalities of individual preventative health seeking behavior, individuals
randomized into first mover positions are likely to bid significantly higher relative
to individuals who make public decisions in a simultaneous setting, consistent with
’leadership by example’. This suggests that leadership effects may only arise when
individual behavior is perceived as having social repercussions. We further find that
this effect is driven by individuals who have more positive beliefs regarding the aver-
age willingness to pay in their groups, which corroborates the literature on leadership
being motivated by conditional cooperation. Contrary to the literature, however, we
find that endogenous leadership does not improve overall bidding outcomes relative
This chapter is co-authored with Ghazala Mansuri.
to exogenously assigned leadership, except in a small subsample of natural leaders.
2.2 Introduction
Leaders have been found to positively influence the resolution of social dilemmas
requiring coordination. Economists have evaluated leadership in the context of pub-
lic goods wherein individual payoff maximization strategies deviate from the social
optimum of investing in the public good, resulting in under provision of public goods
in competitive equilibrium. However, in applying this theory to lab and field set-
tings, subjects are seen to exhibit greater cooperation than predicted by theory and
sufficient subsets of the population contribute their individual endowments to pub-
lic goods. Moreover, introducing sequential decision making in public goods games
has revealed individual willingness to demonstrate ’leadership’ whereby individuals
randomized into in a first mover position (leaders) make higher contributions to the
public good than individuals who make similarly visible choices but in a simultaneous
setting.
Though leadership effects have been frequently attributed to information asymme-
tries between first movers and followers, leadership has also been witnessed in set-
ting characterized by symmetric information. Here, the emergence of leadership is
attributed to the need to resolve coordination problems and social dilemmas (Arce,
2001; Foss, 2001) where leaders induce followers to adopt their behavior through
their example (Hermalin, 1998).
While a substantive literature has explored the underlying theoretical motivations
for exercising leadership, the majority of this work relies on public goods games in
laboratory settings, leaving open the empirical question of whether and how lead-
ership influences translate in real-world social dilemmas that are also characterized
by individual under provision relative to the Pareto-efficient outcome. We analyze
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the impact of sequential decision making on the willingness to pay for preventative
health care products, a product domain where there are substantive private benefits
to consumption, but individual demand is suboptimal.
Lack of investment in low cost preventative health care technologies is one of the
leading causes of excess infant mortality in developing countries, in addition to the
significant morbidity burdens that it places on poor households. However, the ev-
idence on price elasticity of preventative health care products suggests large price
sensitivity, particularly in comparison with remedial care (Dupas, 2011). Our exper-
iment assesses whether an appeal to ’leadership by example’ can assist in improving
the willingness to pay for preventative health care products.
In particular, we attempt to address the problem of low willingness to invest in
drinking water treatment products for diarrhea prevention. Randomized controlled
trials on the take up of water treatment products provide compelling evidence for a
direct relationship between Point of Use (POU) water treatment and a reduction in
the incidence of diarrheal and gastrointestinal diseases - the second leading cause of
under 5 mortality. However, the demand for water treatment products remains low
and highly price sensitive, even amongst households with young children (Ashraf et
al., 2010).
We argue that this setting is amenable to leadership influences because there are
significant spillover benefits and costs of individual preventative care investments.
Diarrheal diseases are highly contagious and endemic to populations that have low
access to sanitation and waste disposal facilities and poor hygiene practices, resulting
in high probability of diarrhea transmission at the neighborhood level. Individual
behavior, however, does not incorporate the spillover costs of failure to invest in
drinking water treatment on vulnerable populations at the societal level. This creates
a social dilemma that leadership behavior can seek to resolve by signaling willingness
to cooperate and coordinate on a socially beneficial equilibrium of higher collective
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investment in preventative health care.
Our experiment therefore assesses whether an appeal to ’leadership by example’
can assist in improving the willingness to pay for POU water treatment products
in a setting of endogenously formed community groups. We elicit the maximum
willingness to pay for one month’s supply of water treatment products by using a
Becker DeGroot Marschack (BDM) auction. We compare the BDM bids of randomly
assigned private bidders with randomly assigned public bidders in a simultaneous
game and with randomly assigned first movers in a sequential game (leaders) in order
to tease out the impact of being a leader as distinct from pure social reputation effects
that occur from public behavior. We find that neither public bidders nor leaders have
statistically distinguishable bids from private bidders, suggesting no impact of social
reputation or leadership on bidding at the conditional mean of the bid distribution.
Given that the theoretical basis for leadership derives from the need to resolve social
dilemmas, we analyze if our results differ by whether the decision regarding purchase
of the water treatment products is framed as a coordination problem. Hence, we
randomize communities into whether or not they receive an information message
that highlights the importance of externalities from individual preventative behavior.
Individuals who are randomized into externalities messaging are told that their failure
to invest in preventative health care has repercussions on the health outcomes of their
surrounding community and vice versa, suggesting a need for coordinated take up of
preventative technologies. We find that in the subgroup primed with externalities,
randomized first movers are likely to bid significantly higher while no similar effect is
found for randomized public bidders who bid in a simultaneous setting. This suggests
that when the frame of externalities is provided, first movers engage in leadership
by example as a potential means for coordination on a socially beneficial outcome.
This leadership effect is fairly large, at nearly 20% of the median bid among private
bidders, and is absent in groups that are not primed with externalities.
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In exploring potential channels through which leadership operates, we find that hav-
ing poor beliefs regarding the average willingness to pay in the community group
results in first movers not demonstrating this leadership effect. This is consistent
with the theory that contributors to public goods are conditional cooperators, and
are more likely to contribute to the public good if they have strong beliefs about the
willingness of others to reciprocate their behavior.
This paper is unique in its application of leadership principles outside of the oft-
researched realm of public goods and charitable contributions. Our field experiment
allows us to directly compare leadership behavior in settings requiring no coordina-
tion with behavior in settings that are framed as a coordination problem, with the
result of leadership emerging only as a solution to a coordination problem. This
result is crucial to understanding whether leadership behavior can be generalized to
other social settings.
2.3 Theoretical Motivation
The question of leadership affecting individual behavior has been frequently explored
in the setting of coordination games involving public goods where individually op-
timal behavior deviates from the social optimum. The classical theory of sequen-
tial contributions to public goods argues that leaders are likely to free-ride on the
contributions of followers and therefore sequential order will reduce overall contri-
butions (Varian, 1994). However, empirical evidence from laboratory experiments
has demonstrated that being in a leadership position not only increases a leader’s
contribution to a common goal but also influences follower contributions, with high
contributions by leaders increasing contributions amongst followers and vice versa.
(Gachter et al. (2012), Rivas and Sutter (2011), Kumru and Vesterlund (2010))
The primary theoretical mechanism underlying the desire to engage in costly lead-
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ership for public good contributions relies on information asymmetries between first
movers and second movers, where leaders employ their position to signal returns
from a public good investment to their uninformed followers (Vesterlund, 2003; Pot-
ters, Sefton and Vesterlund, 2001). However, recent experimental work has provided
evidence in favor of a willingness to engage in leadership even in the presence of
information symmetry. Hence, leaders can be motivated by their social preferences
such as altruism (Andreoni, 1990) and status seeking (Glazer and Konrad, 1996).
However, these motivations should operate symmetrically for followers with pub-
lic actions or public behavior in a simultaneous setting. Therefore, the distinctive
behavior of leaders in a sequential setting must be grounded in their ability to in-
fluence the behavior of followers. Meidinger and Villeval (2002) conclude therefore
that when information is symmetric and signaling carries no informational value for
the followers, leadership operates through inducing reciprocity in followers.
Gachter and Renner (2014) characterize leaders as belief-managers for groups facing
coordination problems, setting beliefs which are conducive to pro-social behavior or
conditional cooperation. They find that a leader’s behavior in the first round of a
public goods game has a strong impact on the beliefs of followers, and that there
is strong path-dependency that emerges in behavior in subsequent rounds. They
further find that the same beliefs trigger the same behavior, even in the absence
of leadership, but that the presence of leaders affects how beliefs are shaped at the
outset.
The possibility of social preferences modifying the impact of leadership allows for
heterogeneity in leadership impacts by different social types. Gachter et al. (2012)
find that when leadership is assigned exogenously, the most effective leaders are those
that not only behave cooperatively but also have strong beliefs about the willingness
of others to cooperate with them, which the authors refer to as optimism. Preget,
Nguyen-van and Willinger (2015) similarly demonstrate that voluntary leaders in a
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public goods experiment are more likely to be conditional cooperators, who are only
willing to contribute more when they believe others will contribute more as well.
Rivas and Sutter (2011) utilize a lab setting to compare endogenously selected leaders
with exogenously assigned leaders in a public goods game to find that groups with
voluntary leaders have substantively higher contributions to the public good than
groups with exogenously assigned leaders. Strikingly, they also find that groups with
exogenously assigned leaders perform worse than control groups with simultaneous
decision making. In a unique application in the field involving naturally occurring
community leaders, Jack and Recalde (2015) find that both natural leaders (with
exogenous leadership status) and randomly assigned leaders improve their contribu-
tions to public goods when placed in a first mover role, but only natural leaders have
a subsequent impact on follower contributions.
Our survey of the literature leads us to conclude that since social preferences can
motivate leadership behavior, there is room for the possibility of sequential decision
making influencing individual behavior in settings beyond the traditional setting of
public good contributions. However, the tendency to demonstrate leadership is it-
self mediated by myriad factors such as the manner in which leadership emerges,
the beliefs of leaders and whether the leaders are randomly assigned or have held
traditional forms of authority. Moreover, existing theory does indicate that leader-
ship may only be relevant in setting requiring coordination on one of many possible
equilibria.
2.4 Setting
Our experiment is conducted in the setting of endogenously formed community
groups drawn from 69 villages in 3 districts in rural Pakistan. We organize a special
meeting of these community groups to disseminate information on water contamina-
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tion, provide information on our point of use water treatment product and collect
information on individual willingness to pay for these products. We experimentally
vary whether an individual’s decision is made in s simultaneous bidding environment
or a sequential bidding environment, in order to assess the impact of being made a
first mover on the resulting bids.
In particular, we want to focus our attention on whether being placed in a leadership
position in a sequential setting induces behavior that is distinct from public behavior
in a simultaneous decision making setting. In the presence of information symmetry,
leaders can be motivated by social consideration of status seeking - the desire to seek
social approval- or by pro-sociality - the desire to influence the behavior of others
by setting a positive example. However, the status seeking incentive should be moot
in private, and identical between an individual whose behavior is public in a simul-
taneous or a sequential game. Therefore in comparing bids between private bidders
and simultaneous public bidders we can identify pure status seeking influences and
in comparing public simultaneous bidders with first movers in a sequential bidding
environment we can tease out pro-sociality, or the desire to induce leadership by
example.
We would also like to assess the degree to which leadership behavior is predicated
on social interdependency and the need to resolve coordination problems as is typi-
cal in a public goods game where self-interested behavior is not aligned with social
efficiency. In making a departure from public good settings to private consumption,
the motivations of leaders can no longer derive from a desire to coordinate on better
social outcomes by managing beliefs or inducing conditional cooperation, unless in-
dividual behavior has social repercussions. Therefore, we introduce an externalities
treatment arm where individual behavior is vested with stronger pro-social consid-
erations as individuals are primed on the spillover costs and benefits of their health
seeking behaviors on their community. This treatment adds belief management and
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conditional cooperation to the set of potential mechanisms that can explain any
’leadership by example’ behavior that may emerge.
Our setting of existing community groups also has the benefit of extant natural
leaders who have held leadership positions within the community. This allows us to
compare naturally occurring leaders with exogenously assigned leaders, in the manner
of Jack and Recalde (2015). In addition, we introduce a parallel treatment arm which
explores the impact of endogenously emerging leadership relative to exogenously
assigned leadership, given the evidence in existing literature of endogenous leadership
being more effective.
2.5 Experimental Design
We use a Becker-DeGroot-Marschack mechanism to elicit the maximum willingness to
pay for POU drinking water treatment chlorine products in the setting of community
group meetings.
Meeting groups are randomized into simultaneous decision making or sequential deci-
sion making. In the simultaneous arm, individuals are randomly assigned to whether
their bid is publicly revealed at the end of the bidding process, or whether it remains
private.
In the sequential arm, individuals are first randomized into whether leadership is
exogenously assigned or endogenously established. In the exogenous leadership arm,
individuals are randomized into whether they will be first movers or second movers.
First movers are told that they will place their BDM bids first, their bids will be
revealed to second movers and then second movers will be allowed to bid. The bids
of second movers will also be revealed publicly once the bidding process is complete,
such that the only difference between leaders and followers is the sequence of decisions
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making and not the publicity of their bid. In the arm with endogenous leadership,
individuals are allowed to self-select into first or second mover positions and place
bids accordingly.
Table A8 in the appendices evaluates randomization balance between the individuals
assigned to simultaneous public bidding, exogenous leadership and endogenous lead-
ership. We find insignificant differences across a number of demographic characteris-
tics, assuring us that randomization was effective insofar as there are no systematic
differences between the treatment arm that could spuriously drive our results.
In addition, villages are randomized into whether they are provided with the exter-
nalities priming message. Therefore, as part of their information treatment, villages
randomized into externalities treatment receive information on how disease transmis-
sion vectors create strong spillover costs on the neighborhood of individual incidences
of illness.
2.6 Results
Table 2.1 presents summary measures of the maximum willingness to pay across our
randomization arms. Across the full sample, we find that assignment to first mover
status does not distinguish bidding behavior significantly from the simultaneous pri-
vate or public bidders. However, when we divide the sample by whether bidders were
exposed to externalities priming, we find that first movers who are primed with ex-
ternalities have significantly higher bids on average than private and public bidders.
This pattern is not replicated in the sub sample that does not receive externalities
priming, suggesting that the priming is crucial to eliciting first mover effects among
bidders. We explore these results further using a regression framework.
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2.6.1 Randomization into Leadership
We first test for whether being randomly assigned to a first mover position affects
willingness to pay for the leaders. We evaluate the following specification, with
community level fixed effects and clustering of standard errors at the meeting level:
MWTPi = αi + β1 ∗ Publici + β2 ∗ Leaderi + γv + εi
Here, we can compare bidding in public in a simultaneous setting with bids placed in
public in a sequential setting as first mover. Consequently, the difference between β1
and β2 provides us with the pure effect of being a first mover relative to a simultaneous
decision setting. We exclude followers from this analysis, so the excluded category
in our regression analysis is private bidders.
Column 1 of Table 2.2 shows the results of this specification for the full sample.
We find that the effect of randomization into public bidding is virtually zero and
statistically insignificant. The impact of being randomized into a first mover position
is positive, but is insignificant at the 10% level. Hence, while randomization into
leadership appears to drive bids up, this effect is not statistically significant at the
conditional mean.
In column 2, we analyze whether this effect differs among natural leaders who are
randomized into first mover positions. Here we find that while natural leaders have
higher bids on average, this effect is not of statistical significance and does not
translate into significantly different behavior in public or in first mover positions.
Overall, therefore, we find that randomization into a first mover position has no
significant impact on the behavior of first movers in our setting of willingness to pay
for water treatment products.
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2.6.2 Externalities and Randomization into Leadership
In Table 2.3 we evaluate whether externalities messaging affects the propensity for
first movers to demonstrate the leadership effects that have been seen in the literature
on public goods.
Column 1 indicates that the overall effect of externalities priming on bids is pos-
itive but insignificant. In column 2, we assess whether externalities priming has
differential effects by treatment type. We find that randomization into simultaneous
public bidding is unaffected by the externalities treatment, since the interaction term
Externalities ∗ Public is small and insignificant. However, bidders randomized into
first mover positions are likely to bid significantly higher when they are exposed to
externalities priming as evidenced by the statistically significant and large coefficient
on Externalities ∗ FirstMover.
This would suggest that leadership motivation is primarily driven by the need to
coordinate on a socially beneficial outcome. In the absence of direct priming re-
garding the spillover costs and benefits of individual behavior, first movers do not
demonstrate a desire to exercise ’leadership by example’.
Since externalities randomization is conducted at the level of the community, column
2 employs fixed effects at a sub-district level. Column 3 employs the same specifi-
cation but with community level fixed effects and the interaction effect is robust to
this change (but the un-interacted coefficient on externalities treatment cannot be
estimated in this specification).
In Table 2.4, we analyze whether externalities messaging differentially impacts the
behavior of natural leaders in our sample. Column 1 assess the bidding behavior of
natural leaders in the absence of externalities messaging and column 2 assesses their
behavior when randomized into the externalities treatment.
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We find that natural leaders appear to bid higher as first movers in the absence
of externalities messaging, but this effect is not statistically significant and is very
imprecisely estimated. On the other hand, with externalities messaging, the overall
bids of natural leaders (in private) are higher, but imprecisely estimated. When
randomized into first mover positions, they behave similarly to exogenously assigned
leaders, since the interaction term FirstMover ∗Externalities is zero, but owing to
their overall higher level of bids their bids a First Movers are higher than exogenously
assigned first movers. This result mimics the results found in the literature on
leadership in public goods contributions, in particular the results of Jack and Recalde
(2015) on the contribution of natural leaders and exogenously assigned leaders in a
field setting, where both varieties of first movers are likely to contribute higher.
However, in our setting, the difference in bids between randomized first movers and
natural leaders as first movers is not statistically distinct.
Our results lend support to the interpretation of leadership by example arising pri-
marily in situations where first movers can signal to followers in a social coordination
problem. Hence, when preventative health care behavior is deemed individual, first
movers do not behave differently from private bidders or public bidders, indicating no
desire to demonstrate leadership. On the other hand, when individual preventative
behavior is lent a social dimension through externalities priming, leadership emerges
with first movers bidding higher as first movers relative to private bidders and public
bidders who bid in a simultaneous environment. This behavior can be rational-
ized with the ’belief management’ interpretation of leadership posited by Gachter
and Renner (2014), where first movers enhance coordination on socially beneficial
equilibria by demonstrating socially beneficial behavior and improving beliefs and
expectations at large, or engaging conditional cooperation from followers.
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2.7 Channels of Leadership
2.7.1 Beliefs
In the spirit of Croson (2002), we elicit the beliefs of individuals regarding the aver-
age willingness to pay at the group level prior to their randomization. As such, we
are able to validate our theory of conditional cooperation generating leadership by
example. Hence, in the setting of public good games, conditional cooperators will
only demonstrate leadership behavior if they have strong beliefs regarding the will-
ingness of their group to also contribute. Similarly, if first movers have poor beliefs
regarding the average willingness to pay at the group level, they will be less likely to
exercise leadership by example if they are conditional cooperators.
We elicit individual beliefs regarding the willingness to pay of the average group
member. We characterize an individual as having poor beliefs if their belief regarding
the average WTP is below the median (or at the median) of the belief distribution.
In Table 2.5 we analyze whether poor beliefs influence first mover behavior. Column
1 indicates that poor beliefs have a large negative impact on private bids. Moreover,
when first movers do not have poor beliefs they demonstrate a leadership effect with
higher bids but this effect is nullified for first movers with poor beliefs. This indicates
that leadership is demonstrated by conditional cooperators, who have stronger beliefs
regarding the willingness of the group to demonstrate some degree of reciprocity.
We evaluate this effect by whether or not individuals have received the externalities
treatment and find that this effect is derived entirely from first movers in the ex-
ternalities treatment (column 3) and that there is no meaningful first mover effect
without externalities even among conditional cooperators. This reinforces our ear-
lier result whereby individual actions must bear social repercussions in order to elicit
leadership behavior among first movers.
98
Finally, we evaluate whether natural leaders are also driven by conditional cooper-
ation. While our coefficients are imprecisely estimated for this significantly smaller
subsample, we find a slightly different pattern emerging, where poor beliefs do not
dampen the first mover effect, suggesting that natural leaders may not be as moti-
vated by conditional cooperation as exogenously assigned leaders.
2.7.2 Number of Leaders
Given that the size of community groups varies, we have natural variance in the
number of exogenously assigned leaders in a group. We evaluate the impact of the
number of leaders in a group on the individual tendency to demonstrate leadership.
We use the subsample of individuals who are exogenously assigned to first or second
mover positions (hence this specification only includes individuals who are in the
sequential exogenous bidding group, i.e. exogenous leaders and exogenous followers).
Table 2.6 indicates that for the smallest groups, where there is a single leader, first
mover effects are fairly large. Overall, the impact of increasing numbers of leaders is
positive on follower bids, after controlling for meeting size. However, the impact of
increasing the number of leaders on first movers themselves is negative, with greater
numbers of first movers leading to lower first mover effects. Hence, more first movers
appear to crowd out individual leadership effects.
We find that this effect is driven primarily by the subsample that does not receive
externalities priming, in column 2, where the reduction in bids of first movers owing
to an increase in the number of first movers is large and highly significant. In the
subsample with externalities priming, on the other hand, we find this effect to be
smaller and insignificant. In column 4, we look at the effect of increasing the number
of first movers on the propensity of natural leader to demonstrate leadership. Owing
to the smaller size of this subsample, the coefficients are statistically insignificant
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but the average effect of more first movers on the bids of natural leaders is not
negative. This suggests that for exogenous leaders, assigning more individuals to
leadership status crowds out individual motivation to demonstrate leadership but
that this crowding out does not arise for natural leaders.
2.8 Endogenous Leadership
We compare the overall impact of endogenous leadership with the impact of ex-
ogenously assigned leadership in Table 2.7. In a public goods setting, endogenous
leadership has been shown to increase the overall level of contributions. We find no
such parallel in our setting, with the overall level of bids being virtually identical
between the endogenous sample and the exogenous sample.
Evaluating the subsample of natural leaders, we again find that there is no significant
difference in their bids overall when endogenous bidding is allowed. However, parsing
the sample by whether or not externalities priming is received, we find that in the ab-
sence of externalities priming natural leaders in the endogenous selection subsample
are bidding higher overall than in the exogenously assigned subsample. This differ-
ence disappears, however, when externalities priming is introduced. This appears
to be a result of the average level of bids rising in the subsample with externalities
priming, which wipes out the differential effect of being a natural leader.
2.9 Discussion
Our results indicate that first movers are only inclined to ’lead by example’ in sit-
uations where there are social benefits or costs of individual behavior. Hence we
find that there is no average effect on bidding of first movers when they are exoge-
nously assigned to leadership. However, in the subsample of first movers belonging
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to groups that have received priming on the externalities of individual behavior, we
do find exogenously assigned leaders bidding higher that bidders who bid in public
but in a simultaneous bidding environment, suggesting that their motives for bidding
higher derive from the sequential nature of the decision process in their groups.
We further identify that the first movers who bid higher in leadership positions are
also more likely to believe in a higher level of average bids within their groups. This
is consistent with earlier literature indicating that leadership effects are motivated
by conditional cooperation and therefore leaders tend to be individual who have
stronger beliefs regarding the willingness of their groups to reciprocate their actions.
Finally, we find that endogenous leadership is no more beneficial to eliciting higher
willingness to pay in our setting than exogenous leadership. This is in contrast with
existing evidence on endogenous leadership improving overall contributions to public
goods. However, we do find evidence for this trend in the actions of natural leaders,
but only when they are not exposed to externalities priming.
Our results shed light on how leadership motivations translate in a unique field
setting of decision making over the willingness to pay for a private good, which
possesses spillover benefits for society. We demonstrate that highlighting the social
repercussions of individual behavior are crucial to eliciting the leadership effects that
have been found in the experimental literature on public goods contributions. Hence,
the desire to demonstrate leadership is only salient in the experimental framing
that creates a coordination problem and enhances scope for a coordinated push
towards a solution. In our case, this is the externalities framing, which highlights
the importance of individual actions on the societal level. This result speaks our
ability to generalize the benefits of sequential decision making by highlighting a
crucial feature of decision making environments - the need to coordinate on a social
optimum - that will elicit favorable behavior from first movers.
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Given our field setting, however, we are only able to evaluate these effects in a one-
shot game and are not in a position to evaluate the evolution of these effects in a
repeated game setting, as it the norm in the experimental literature.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: Maximum Willingness to Pay by Randomization
Maximum Willingness to Pay (Mean)
Full Sample Externalities No Externalities
Priming Priming
Simultaneous Private Bidders 106.59 106.11 107.03
Simultaneous Public Bidders 107.18 110.42 104.04
Sequential First Movers 110.71 118.16 102.65
All types 107.46 111.17 103.62
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Mean Dep Var 108.0 108.0
Fixed Effects Community
Note: The dependent variable is the individual max
WTP. Standard errors are clustered at the meeting level
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Externalities * Public 6.300 5.217
(4.433) (4.288)
First Mover -7.074 -4.667
(6.186) (5.733)
Externalities*First Mover 21.28** 19.18**
(8.984) (7.775)
_cons 106.0*** 108.9*** 106.1***
(3.128) (4.415) (2.452)
N 2641 2641 2641
Mean Dep Var 108.0 108.0 108.0
Fixed Effects SMT Community
Notes: The dependent variable is the individual max WTP. SMT is a
sub-district aggregation. Standard errors are clustered at meeting level
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Natural Leader 4.492 7.887
(7.918) (7.106)
Public*Natural Leader -0.573 -9.891
(11.44) (10.65)
First Mover -7.138 14.98**
(6.612) (6.624)





Mean Dep Var 104.7 111.3
Fixed Effects Community
Note: The dependent variable is the individual max WTP. Standard
errors are clustered at the meeting level
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Table 2.5: Beliefs and First Mover Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Max WTP
Full sample No Externalities Externalities Full sample
Public 0.942 -0.600 2.496 1.420
(2.940) (3.967) (4.380) (3.317)
Poor beliefs -13.24*** -15.20*** -11.44** -12.64***
(3.747) (5.141) (5.421) (3.859)
Public*Poor Beliefs 0.638 -1.731 3.411 0.702
(4.260) (6.141) (5.981) (4.557)
First Mover (FM) 8.239* -2.293 18.64*** 8.869*
(4.980) (7.663) (6.266) (5.161)
Poor Beliefs*FM -7.277 -4.305 -9.295 -8.419
(6.027) (8.737) (8.118) (6.280)












N 2641 1333 1308 2641
Mean Dep Var 108.0 104.7 111.3 108.0
Fixed Effects Community
Note: The dependent variable is the individual max WTP. Standard errors are
clustered at the meeting level. Constant suppressed in output
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Table 2.6: Number of First Movers and First Mover Impact
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Max WTP
Full sample No Externalities Externalities Full sample
First Mover (FM) 14.66** 16.23* 13.19 18.07**
(6.657) (9.507) (8.303) (7.643)
# FMs 8.381** 12.41*** -4.161 8.655**
(3.872) (3.718) (5.992) (3.903)
FM* # FMs -2.943* -4.551** -1.218 -3.588**
(1.578) (2.181) (2.030) (1.727)
# meeting members -2.128** -3.848*** 1.476 -2.114**
(0.972) (1.086) (1.518) (0.974)








_cons 107.0*** 114.3*** 103.2*** 104.8***
(9.016) (16.79) (10.16) (9.358)
N 1493 700 793 1493
Mean Dep Var 108.9 103.3 113.9 108.9
Fixed Effects Community
Notes: The dependent variable is the individual max WTP. Standard errors are the
clustered at meeting level
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Table 2.7: Endogenous First Movers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Max WTP
Full sample No Externalities Externalities Full sample
Endogenous Sample -0.392 -1.081 -3.472 1.005
(1.987) (2.137) (3.526) (2.584)
Natural Leader (NL) 4.773 6.463 2.651
(3.816) (5.756) (5.080)
NL*Endogenous 6.966 16.24* 0.729
(5.963) (9.616) (7.406)
_cons 108.9*** 108.3*** 102.3*** 113.6***
(2.323) (2.451) (3.891) (3.140)
N 2906 2906 1354 1552
Mean Dep Var 108.7 108.7 102.2 114.4
Fixed Effects Community
Note: The dependent variable is the individual max WTP. Standard errors are
clustered at the meeting level
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2.11 Appendices
Table A8: Balance Across Treatment Arms
Public Exogenous Endogenous p-value
Simultaneous Leadership Leadership (joint)
Female 0.516 0.554 0.559 0.175
(0.016) (0.018) (0.013)
Education (years) 1.740 1.567 1.549 0.505
(0.125) (0.141) (0.100)
# household(HH) members 7.960 7.866 8.024 0.833
(0.124) (0.133) (0.099)
# children 0-5years 0.644 0.673 0.664 0.748
(0.030) (0.031) (0.023)
Household Head 0.712 0.742 0.694 0.126
(0.014) (0.016) (0.012)
Poverty score at the HH level 24.150 23.990 23.828 0.761
(0.443) (0.515) (0.380)
Natural Leader 0.139 0.123 0.112 0.242
(0.011) (0.012) (0.008)
Mixed Meeting Group 0.652 0.693 0.688 0.042
(0.015) (0.017) (0.012)
Contamination at source 7.501 7.486 7.475 0.571
(0.058) (0.065) (0.048)
# meeting members 28.556 29.869 29.857 0.023
(0.332) (0.412) (0.299)
Beliefs re. Average WTP 81.485 78.487 80.097 0.516
(1.302) (1.421) (1.070)
No beliefs re. Average WTP 0.188 0.208 0.202 0.758
(0.013) (0.015) (0.011)




Comparing Individual and Altruistic Subsidies for
Health Technology Take Up
3.1 Abstract
Evidence from both lab and field experiments supports the theory that individuals
have social preferences that incline them towards altruism in environments involving
giving or sharing such as charitable contribution drives or dictator games. We test
whether these social preferences can be harnessed towards improving take up of pre-
ventative health care products by designing an altruistic subsidy - a subsidy that can
be shared with an anonymous partner and is only transferred to the partner if the
subject commits to purchase. We find no significant difference in the probability of
purchase between subjects randomized into shared subsidies and those randomized
into individual subsides, in spite of subjects potentially receiving lower effective sub-
sides through sharing. Consistent with the literature on sorting in dictator games,
we find that more subjects share non-zero amounts of their subsidy when they are
exogenously assigned to a shared subsidy, even though they have the option of shar-
ing zero, relative to when subjects can choose whether to be assigned to individual
versus shared subsidies. This is consistent with the presence of ’reluctant sharers’
This chapter is co-authored with Ghazala Mansuri.
who would choose to avoid sharing environments but will share if placed in such an
environment. However, subjects who self-select into sharing are significantly more
likely to share a larger amount of their subsidy than exogenously assigned sharers
and are more likely to commit to purchasing the product. We also find that priming
subjects with information on the externalities of individual health behaviors does
not result in more subjects sharing but does result in more generous sharing and
higher probability of purchase, consistent with subjects not changing their prefer-
ences regarding whether to share but coordinating on a higher sharing equilibrium
conditional on sharing non zero amounts.
3.2 Introduction
Evidence of individual proclivity for prosocial behavior abounds in the real world,
with large proportions of society contributing time and resources in the service of
charitable causes or public goods. In addition, the literature on team incentives indi-
cates that individuals will expend greater effort for team payoffs relative to individual
payoffs, placing nearly as much or more value on rewards to others as to themselves
(Babcock et al., 2012). In a laboratory setting, the tendency for pro-social behavior
has been demonstrated by way of anonymous, one-shot dictator games where one
subject is given the decision to allocate an endowment between themselves and an-
other individual. A purely rational, self-interested outcome would entail zero sharing
however this result is consistently refuted in experimental settings, with a significant
proportion of individuals choosing to share their endowments with their matched
partners.
However, in analyzing the motivations for these social preferences, researchers have
found evidence that not all voluntary acts of sharing are purely utility improving
as some individuals have a tendency to avoid sharing when given a costless option
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of exiting from sharing environments (Lazear et al., 2012; Dana et al., 2006; Della
Vigna et al. 2012; Andreoni et al., 2011). This is an interesting result insofar as
when exogenously assigned to a sharing environment, sharing nothing is equivalent in
terms of monetary payoffs with opting out of a sharing environment when given the
opportunity to sort. However, on average, individuals are less likely to share nothing
but more likely to opt out of sharing environments, suggesting that there are psychic
costs to being placed in sharing environments and sharing nothing, which precipitate
higher sharing but also create incentives to exit sharing environments when given
the opportunity. This phenomenon creates a departure between the results that we
would encounter in a controlled lab or field environment and a real-world sharing
equilibrium where individuals have the ability to select in and out of environments.
We explore these features of individual behavior in a unique field setting involving
altruistic subsidies for drinking water treatment products - subsidies that can be
shared with members of your peer group - in communities experiencing a collective
public health problem - high level of drinking water contamination. Lack of invest-
ment in low cost preventative health care technologies is one of the leading causes of
excess infant mortality in developing countries, in spite of the demonstrable benefits
of these technologies, suggesting the need for subsidies to improve individual take
up. In addition, the burden of communicable diseases is very high in these settings,
owing to poor sanitation and waste disposal facilities, creating spillover benefits and
costs from individual preventative behavior and creating a situation requiring a co-
ordinated push towards higher adoption at a community level. This creates an ideal
setting for developing incentive mechanisms that harness social preferences to solve
public health problems accruing at the societal level.
While monetary incentives are a tried and tested means of encouraging healthy be-
haviors, these incentives have typically been directed towards individuals and have
failed to incorporate the social nature of public health behaviors or to harness the
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power of social preferences. Our experiment’s purpose is to evaluate the potential
for altruistic subsidies relative to individual subsidies in improving the take up of
drinking water treatment products in communities that face high levels of drink-
ing water contamination. An altruistic subsidy, in our context, ties an individual’s
take up decision to their altruism which can be exercised by giving away a portion
of their subsidy to their anonymous partner. Hence, while sharing a fixed subsidy
may lower an individual’s willingness to adopt a particular product by raising its
effective price, it may also raise an individual’s willingness to adopt owing to pro-
social considerations whereby an individual’s take up decision has repercussion on
not only their own subsidy but also the subsidy that their partner receives. There-
fore, how shared subsidies perform relative to individual subsidies is an empirical
question similar to the question of altruistic/cooperative rewards versus individual
rewards. The existing evidence on individual’s exerting greater effort for teams, and
exercising pro-social sharing behavior, would suggest that these altruistic subsidies
could increase individual take up at a smaller cost than individual subsidies, owing
to pro-social preferences.
In addition, we would like to assess the willingness of individuals to share altru-
istic subsidies for the take up of drinking water treatment products. However, in
recognizing that allowing individuals to sort in and out of sharing environments is
more representative of real world behavior, we compare outcomes between exogenous
assignment to sharing and endogenous selection into sharing environments. Impor-
tantly, we would like to assess whether imposed sharing deviates from self-selected
sharing and whether controlled experimental settings will deviate from self-select
outcomes if joint subsidies are employed as a policy tool to encourage greater takeup
of health technologies.
We find that exogenous assignment to shared subsidies results in a statistically in-
significant lowering of a subject’s probability of purchase relative to individual subsi-
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dies. Given evidence for positive sharing overall, the subjects in this subgroup receive
lower subsidies and face higher effective prices as a result of sharing their subsidies.
Therefore an insignificantly lower probability of purchase indicates the presence of
social preferences that are serving as a counterweight for the lower purchase proba-
bility owing to lower subsidies and higher prices of products. This also implies that
we can get ’stretch the buck’ of health subsidies by employing an altruistic subsidy,
since the lower retained subsidy does not adversely affect take up while the shared
portion of the subsidy can increase take up for the recipient. Though in our current
design, we do not analyze recipient behavior, given price responsiveness of agents an
increase in take up from receiving a subsidy can be reasonably assumed on the part
of the recipient.
However, when subjects are permitted to choose their sharing environment and opt
into either shared subsidies or individual subsidies, the average probability of pur-
chase is statistically significantly lower than with individual subsidies. Hence, with
endogenous sorting, shared subsidies lower the probability of purchase relative to
individual subsidies. The departure of results between exogenous sharing and en-
dogenous sharing indicates the presence of ’reluctant sharers’ who increase their
probability of purchase conditional on being placed in sharing environments but
would avoid these environments when allowed to sort out of them. This result im-
plies, therefore, that harnessing social preferences will only be effective in scenarios
involving groups or teams with fixed or mandatory membership but would lapse in
the presence of voluntary membership.
We further assess whether the decision to share is influenced by priming regard-
ing the externalities of individual investment in preventative health care. We use
the externalities frame to create an environment where the social optimum deviates
from the purely individual (selfish) equilibrium, creating demand for mechanisms
that facilitate coordination, and assess whether such framing will affect the sharing
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equilibrium. We find that externalities priming does not affect the number of sharers
overall, but does impact the amount of sharing insofar as subjects are more likely to
share more generously when primed with externalities.
3.3 Theoretical Motivation
A slew of experiments involving dictator games have revealed that when asked to
share an endowment while a significant proportion of subject share nothing this
is rarely the choice made by a majority of subjects (Engel, 2011). Given that an
outcome involving positive sharing deviates from a simple payoff maximizing utility
formulation, it speaks to individuals deriving some measure of social utility or ’warm
glow’ (Andreoni, 1990) from their sharing behavior.
The literature on group incentives points towards another outcome driven by pro-
social motivations, namely the desire to perform better as part of a team versus as
an individual. Hence, the small body of empirical research on team incentives finds
compelling evidence that individuals expend greater effort when their performance
affects the rewards of their peers than when it affects only their own payoffs. Babcock
et al. (2015) find that individuals value a marginal dollar of reward for their partners
from two thirds to twice as much as an additional dollar of reward for themselves.
Similarly, Schofield et al. (2015) find that both purely altruistic and cooperative
incentive schemes perform just as well as individual incentive schemes in the short
run in an experiment designed to encourage the elderly to complete more mental
exercises, where altruistic incentives are individual rewards which are tied not to own
performance but the performance of your partner and cooperative incentives are tied
to the performance of both partners jointly. Moreover, they find that altruistic and
cooperative incentive schemes outperformed individual incentives in the long run,
leading to greater persistence in behavior past the receipt of the incentives.
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However, the literature on dictator games has also found that when individuals are
placed in environments where they can select out of the decision to share, they are
less likely to share overall. Hence, Lazear et al. (2012) find that on average 33% of
individuals in their sample are ’reluctant sharers’ who will share when placed in the
environment of a dictator game but will opt to avoid a dictator game environment
in favor of keeping their endowment for themselves when provided with costless exit.
This also results in the overall amount shared falling by more than 50% when people
are allowed to sort out of sharing environments.
Dana et al. (2006) have similarly found that a third of their sample prefers to
avoid a dictator game with an endowment of $10 in favor of receiving a private
payoff of $9, suggesting that such individuals are willing to incur a cost to avoid
sharing environments. Lazear et al. (2012) find that subsidizing re-entry into sharing
primarily attracts those who are otherwise inclined to share the least, and that
probability of reentry is inversely related to the amount shared among reluctant
sharers. Broberg et al. (2007) use a BDM auction to estimate the willingness to pay
for the opportunity to exit a dictator game and find that the mean reservation price
is 82% of the endowment.
Such avoidance has also been witnessed in field experiments on charitable giving.
Della Vigna et al. (2012) conduct a fund raising field experiment where some house-
holds are notified of the exact time of solicitation and others are allowed to request
beforehand that they not be disturbed. These avoidance options lower the proba-
bility of people opening their door by 9% and 23% respectively and lower overall
donations in the latter case by 28-40%. Similarly, Andreoni et al. (2011) find in a
fund raising campaign for Salvation Army that while verbal solicitation significantly
increases giving it also increases avoidance. They conclude that the tendency to
contribute to charity is motivated by the emotional response it induces in givers and
avoidance is practiced against empathetic stimuli that would incline a person to give.
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Dana et al. (2006) perceive the same behavior as arising from a desire to not violate
others’ expectations.
The importance of psychological or belief-oriented cues in eliciting sharing is rein-
forced by experimental literature that highlights the impact of social framing in influ-
encing choice. Hence, for instance, Kay and Ross (2003) show that priming prisoner’s
dilemma games with cooperative labels (Community game vs Wall Street game) re-
sults in higher degrees of cooperation. Ellingsen et al. (2012) further demonstrate
that these framing effects primarily derive from their ability to allow for coordination
in games with multiple equilibria. However, as Dreber et al. (2013) discover, fram-
ing is ineffective in a pure dictator game, which is consistent with the theory that
framing does not affect stable preferences but instead affects their beliefs and serves
as a coordination device in games that require coordination on a socially optimal
equilibrium, such as the prisoner’s dilemma.
The overall conclusion from the current literatures is that there is strong evidence
for individuals behaving in a pro-social manner, whether by way of responding to
incentives that reward others (altruistic rewards) or by way of engaging in acts
of altruism such as charitable giving. Moreover, individual behavior is susceptible
to framing effects which can allow individuals to coordinate on socially beneficial
outcomes that may not be achievable in the absence of coordination. However, we
also find that a significant proportion of individuals in society are reluctant altruists
insofar as they share individual rewards or engage in acts of altruism conditional on
being placed in sharing environments or when directly solicited but are willing to
pay a cost to avoid these environments. Additionally, framing appears to not alter
underlying preferences but merely assist in coordination.
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3.4 Experimental Design
We use the setting of community group meetings in rural Pakistan where subjects are
randomly assigned to individual subsidies, or one of two types of altruistic subsidies
tied to the purchase of a one month supply of water treatment products: exogenously
imposed shared subsidies and endogenously selected shared subsidies. The subsidies
are directed insofar as they can only be applied to the purchase of the product and
have no cash value outside of the experiment. Individual demand for the product
is assessed using a Take It Or Leave It (TIOLI) mechanism where subjects draw a
random price and are asked whether they would be willing to pay this price for the
product. If they accept the TIOLI offer price and commit to the purchase, their
effective purchase price is the randomized offer price minus any subsidies.
Subjects assigned to individual subsidies are provided with a flat subsidy associated
with their purchase of the water treatment products. This subsidy is equivalent to
just under 40% of the median offer price, but roughly 15% of the market price of
the product. If the subjects decide to accept their TIOLI randomized offer price,
their effective price is the random price minus the flat subsidy. If they choose not to
purchase, they receive neither the product nor the subsidy.
Subjects assigned to exogenously imposed shared subsides (exogenous sharing) are
provided with the same flat subsidy as the subjects receiving individual subsidies
(Rs. 40). However, they are instructed that they have been matched with another
anonymous member of their meeting group. They can share any amount of the
subsidy with their anonymous partner, including zero. They first make a choice
regarding how much they would like to share with their partner. Thereafter, they
draw a random price as part of the TIOLI mechanism and choose whether they would
purchase the product at the price drawn.
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In this design every subject is both a dictator and a receiver, insofar as if they are in
randomized into shared subsidies they will not only retain a portion of their subsidy
but will also have a probability of receiving a portion of their partner’s subsidy.
Therefore, their effective purchase price is the randomized offer price minus they
portion of their own subsidy that they retained minus the portion of their partner’s
subsidy that was shared with them. But, when making the decision to accept or
reject the TIOLI offer price, subjects remain unaware of how much subsidy has been
shared with them by their partner and this information is only revealed at the end
of the experiment. It cannot therefore affect their own purchase decision. Therefore,
the outcome of interest in our design is not the behavior as a recipient but the
behavior as a sharer.
In addition, in a shared subsidy context, if the subject refuses their TIOLI offer
and chooses not to purchase the product, not only do they fail to utilize their own
subsidy but the subsidy portion that they have chosen to share with their anonymous
partner is also wasted. Therefore, your partner does not receive any benefits from
your sharing if you do not also choose to purchase the product.
Subjects assigned to endogenous sharing are told that they can choose an individual
subsidy or self-select into a shared subsidy. If they select a shared subsidy, they will
be matched with an anonymous partner and they can choose to transfer a portion
of their subsidy to their partner. As in the case with exogenous sharing, they draw
a random offer price but the effective purchase price is the random draw minus the
portion of the subsidy they retain and any potential subsidy that is transferred to
them by their anonymous partners. The only difference between the endogenous
sharing group and exogenous sharing group is the ability of endogenous sharers to
opt out of shared subsidies altogether in favor of individual subsidies.
Appendix Table A9 evaluates randomization balance between the individuals as-
signed to individual subsidies, exogenous sharing and endogenous sharing. We find
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insignificant differences across a number of demographic characteristics. There ap-
pear to be statistically significant differences in the number of household members
between groups, but the mean differences in these numbers is negligible in magnitude.
Similarly, while there appear to be difference in between the randomization groups in
the contamination at source, these are also of a negligible magnitude. Overall, we are
therefore assured that randomization was effective insofar as there are no systematic
differences between the treatment arm that could spuriously drive our results.
In addition, villages are randomized into whether they are provided with the external-
ities priming message. Villages that are randomized into the externalities treatment
receive information on how the nature of water borne disease transmission creates
strong spillover costs on the neighborhood from individual incidences of illness. As
a result, individual failure to adopt preventative health care products has repercus-
sions not just on individual health but also on health outcomes at the community
level. This randomization is conducted at the village level to prevent information
contamination between community groups in the same village.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Our sample consists of 2701 individuals in 208 meeting groups drawn from 66 villages.
The sample is roughly evenly divided between individuals randomized into individual
subsidies, exogenous sharing and endogenous sharing. As indicated in Table 3.1,
subjects assigned individual subsidies receive a flat subsidy of Rs. 40, equivalent to
nearly 40% of the median randomized price, where the price is distributed uniformly
over the interval Rs. 60- Rs. 150. The mean amount of the subsidy retained by
exogenous sharers is Rs. 28 (median Rs. 30), suggesting positive amounts shared over
123
a significant proportion of the sample. In the subsample with endogenous sharing,
the mean amount of subsidy retained is Rs. 32 (median 40), suggesting lower sharing
overall and by a smaller proportion of this subsample. However, conditional on self-
selecting into sharing their subsidy, subjects retain on average Rs. 23 (median Rs.
20) suggesting higher sharing among endogenous sharers who choose to share.
3.5.2 Willingness to Purchase
We first test for whether being randomly assigned to a shared subsidy affects will-
ingness to purchase the product relative to an individual subsidy. We evaluate a
conditional logit specification of the probability of purchase, controlling for the ran-
domized offer price, with community level fixed effects and clustering of standard
errors at the community level. We report the results in odds ratios, with individual
subsidies as the omitted category.
Table 3.2 indicates that random assignment to exogenous sharing results in lower
odds of purchase relative to individual subsidies, but this effect is imprecisely esti-
mated with large confidence intervals which incorporate the possibility of increased
odds of purchase as well as decreased odds of purchase. This result can be viewed
as corroborating existing research insofar as it suggests the presence in our sample
of individuals who are swayed by pro-social considerations into not lowering their
propensity to purchase the product in spite of lower subsidies and therefore the
decline in willingness to purchase is not statistically significant.
Interestingly, we also find that with endogenous sharing the odds of purchase are
significantly lower overall. This result is suggestive of sorting in the presence of
reluctant sharers who when exogenously assigned to sharing are inclined to behave
prosocially and commit to purchase owing to the subsidy to others being tied to their
own purchase choice, but are likely to exit this sharing environment when given the
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option to do so. We explore this further by dividing the exogenous and endogenous
sample into those who select into sharing and those that opt out of sharing. We
find that individuals who choose to not share when exogenously assigned to sharing
as well as individuals who choose to not share when they endogenously self-select
into not sharing have comparably lower odds of purchase. On the other hand, when
individuals are endogenously select into sharing they are significantly more likely
to make the purchase relative to exogenous sharers and to subjects who receive
individual subsidies. These individuals are most certainly demonstrating pro-social
motivation as they are receiving a smaller effective subsidy but are significantly more
likely to purchase than individuals with larger subsidies. However, this result also
implies that a larger proportion of the endogenous sample is opting out of sharing
and therefore the mean effect in this subsample is lowered odds of purchase.
3.5.3 Amount of Sharing
We proceed to examine the amount of sharing between exogenous assignment to
sharing and endogenous selection. In column 3 we verify that when individuals can
self-select their subsidy type they are significantly less likely to share their subsidy
than when they are exogenously assigned to shared subsidies. Hence, our results with
product subsidies mirror the dictator game literature whereby people when placed in
an environment where the choice is framed as ’how much to share’ are significantly
less likely to share nothing than when the choice is framed as ’whether to share’.
We also find that conditional on choosing to share, the mean amount of subsidy
shared is statistically significantly higher in the endogenous selection sample. The
point estimate is small, at little over 5% of the mean subsidy in the exogenous sharing
sample, but very precisely estimated.
We analyze how the distribution of sharing shifts between the exogenous sharers and
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endogenous sharers conditional on sharing a positive amount, by creating subsidy
bins for the amounts shared: a quarter of the subsidy or less (<= 25%), half of the
subsidy (<= 50%& > 25%) or more than half the subsidy (> 50%). Table 3.3 shows
that conditional on sharing a positive amount, self-select sharers in the endogenous
sharing sample are significantly less likely to share 25% or less of their subsidy. This
corroborates the results from Lazear et al. (2012) and Della Vigna et al. (2012)
where where willing sharers who select into sharing environments also tend to be the
most generous sharers.
3.5.4 Externalities
We evaluate the effect of externalities priming on our outcomes of interest. Since this
randomization is carried out at the level of the community, we switch to sub-district
(SMT) fixed effects in our conditional logit specification.
As indicated in Table 3.4, being randomized into no externalities priming appears to
lower the odds of purchase in the exogenous sharing sample but raise the odds of pur-
chase if externalities priming is introduced. However, the coefficients are imprecisely
estimated, with large confidence intervals and are therefore not statistically distin-
guishable from one another. On the other hand, in the subsample with endogenous
sharing while in the absence of externalities priming there is a lower probability of
purchase, as is consistent with the full sample results, we find a statistically significant
higher probability of purchase when externalities priming is introduced. Therefore,
it does appear that priming is inducing individuals to purchase and this effect is
stronger in the endogenous sharing sample.
We parse this effect of priming further by analyzing how it affects those who choose
to share and those who choose to keep individual subsidies in both the endogenous
and exogenous sharing samples. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.4 compare the sharing
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equilibrium in villages with and without externalities priming. In villages with no
priming, the pattern of the full sample is replicated with individuals who do not
share their subsidies having a lower propensity to purchase, but individuals who
opt into sharing subsidies having a higher propensity of purchase and even more so
with endogenous sharing. However, we find a departure in the pattern among those
individuals in the endogenous and exogenous sharing sample who choose to share
their subsidies. Hence, when individuals are allowed to sort into sharing, those that
decide to share are significantly more likely to purchase in the presence of priming,
and have the highest odds of purchase of any subsample. However, those who opt
into sharing in the exogenous sharing subsample are (insignificantly) less likely to
purchase. It would appear, therefore, that among more altruistic types who willingly
choose to share, the salience of externalities creates a stronger motivation to purchase.
On the other hand, among reluctant sharers the impact of externalities priming is to
weaken their incentive to engage in the behavior relative to when there is no priming.
This makes intuitive since insofar as reluctant sharers are less willing to engage with
pro-social activity and would conceivably be less likely to engage with mechanisms
requiring social coordination.
Overall, we find in column 4 that the impact of externalities priming on the proba-
bility of sharing is insignificant among both the exogenous sharing and endogenous
sharing samples, suggesting that priming in this case has not increased the odds
of sharing overall. Parsing results by how much is shared overall, we find that the
overall effect of moderately higher subsidies being shared in the endogenous sharing
sample is driven primarily by individuals exposed to the externalities priming, since
the uninteracted coefficient on endogenous sharing (no priming subsample) in Table
4 column 1 is nearly zero. We further find that with externalities priming, the dis-
tribution of endogenous sharing shifts towards greater generosity, with significantly
higher endogenous sharers sharing more than 50% of their subsidies, as shown in
Table 3.5.
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Overall, we find that priming with externalities induces a stronger incentive to com-
mit to purchase among individuals who self-select into shared subsidies. However,
it lowers the commitment to purchase among people who choose to share in the ex-
ogenous sharing subsample, which includes reluctant sharers. Therefore, imposing
an additional coordination problem on reluctant sharers appears to lower their pro-
social motivations overall and create greater reluctance towards purchasing in the
face of lower subsidies and higher effective prices.
3.5.5 Discussion
In a simple comparison of altruistic subsidies against individual subsidies in trigger-
ing take up, we can conclude that altruistic subsidies do not outperform individual
subsidies since they induce an insignificantly lower probability of purchase overall.
Therefore, while there is evidence of some people responding to social incentives and
not lowering their probability of purchase when induced to share, this is not the
mean effect and there is significant heterogeneity in behavior as evidenced by the
large confidence interval over which predicted probability of purchase is distributed
for exogenous sharing. This indicates that social preferences are not strong enough
to serve as a counterweight for monetary incentives such as direct subsidies.
Moreover, even in the domain of health, there is a significant class of reluctant sharers
who will select out of the sharing environment when given the opportunity to sort.
Therefore, barring the ability of policy practitioners penalizing exit from the sharing
mechanism, the endogenous probability of purchase with sharing and sorting is likely
to be strictly worse than with individual subsidies, except in the case of teams or
groups with fixed membership.
Overall, we find that priming individuals with information on externalities induces
a stronger incentive to commit to purchase among individuals who self-select into
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shared subsidies. However, it somewhat lowers the commitment to purchase among
people who choose to share in the exogenous sharing subsample, which includes reluc-
tant sharers. Therefore, imposing an additional coordination problem on reluctant
sharers appears to lower their pro-social motivations overall and create greater reluc-
tance towards purchasing in the face of lower subsidies and higher effective prices.
Our results also indicate accord with the theory that priming does not alter under-
lying preferences but merely assists in coordination as we find that priming does not
draw more people into sharing. However, among the sharers, there is a significantly
higher likelihood of sharing more generously and purchasing the product.
Our results may be construed as a lower bound on sharing behavior, however, given
that the identity of sharers and recipients is anonymous and the game is one-shot
with no updating of beliefs. Moreover, the product is new and conceivably does not
have strong social value associated with it at the very outset.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Individual Exogenous Endogenous
Subsidy Sharing Sharing
Sample Size 942 881 878
Mean Subsidy Retained (Rs.) 40 28.02 32.15
Median Subsidy Retained (Rs.) 40 30 40
Opts to Share (%) 0 74.46 47.38
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Table 3.2: Sharing with Exogenous and Endogenous Assignment
(1) (2) (3)
Prob of Purchase Opts to Share
Exogenous Sharing 0.844 0.498**
(0.142) (0.158)
Endogenous Sharing 0.760* 0.557*** 0.239***
(0.120) (0.118) (0.0461)
Price draw 0.972*** 0.972***
(0.00271) (0.00263)
Exogenous Sharing*Opts to Share 1.056
(0.303)
Endogenous Sharing*Opts to Share 1.985**
(0.531)
N 2449 2449 1735
Mean Dep Var 0.82 0.82 0.75
Fixed Effects Community
The dependent variable (columns 1 and 2) represent the probability of individuals
accepting their TIOLI offer price. Column 3 represents the probability of sharing
a positive amount conditional on being assigned to endogenous sharing.
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 3.3: Amount Shared with Exogenous and Endogenous Assignment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subsidy Amount
(Rs.) Pr(Rs. 1-10) Pr(Rs. 11-20) Pr(Rs. 21-40)
Endogenous Sharing 0.900* -0.0625* 0.0497 0.0128
(0.480) (0.0372) (0.0369) (0.0146)
_cons 15.92*** 0.435*** 0.525*** 0.0398***
(0.186) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.00565)
N 1072 1072 1072 1072
Mean Dep Var 16.08 0.42 0.54 0.04
Fixed Effects Community
The dependent variable (column 1) represent the monetary amount of subsidy
shared conditional on individuals selecting into sharing. Columns 2-4 represent
the probability of individuals sharing a 0-25%, 25%-50%, or 50%-100% portion
of their subsidy
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Table 3.4: Externalities Priming and Likelihood of Sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prob of Purchase Opts to
No Priming Ext Priming Share
Externalities Priming 1.103 0.896
(0.336) (0.215)
Exogenous Sharing (EXO) 0.857 0.451 0.551
(0.234) (0.221) (0.224)
Endogenous Sharing (ENDO) 0.721** 0.505** 0.618* 0.291***





EXO*Opts to Share 1.292 0.766
(0.506) (0.355)
ENDO*Opts to Share 1.564 2.959***
(0.567) (1.037)
Price Drawn 0.976*** 0.972*** 0.973***
(0.00273) (0.00324) (0.00440)
N 2701 1339 1110 1759
Mean Dep Var 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.76
Fixed Effects SMT Community SMT
The dependent variable (columns 1-3) represent the probability of individuals
accepting their TIOLI offer price. Columns 2 & 3 divide the sample by whether
individuals received externalities priming. Column 4 represents the probability of
opting to share a positive amount conditional on being assigned to endogenous
sharing. Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 3.5: Externalities and Amount Shared
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subsidy Amount
(Rs.) Pr(Rs.1-10) Pr(Rs.11-20) Pr(Rs.21-40)
Endogenous Sharing (ENDO) 0.145 -0.0325 0.0459 -0.0134
(0.562) (0.0487) (0.0511) (0.0138)
Externalities Priming 0.429 -0.0389 0.0424 -0.00352
(0.743) (0.0576) (0.0576) (0.0185)
ENDO*Externalities 0.874 0.0107 -0.0717 0.0610**
(0.883) (0.0685) (0.0705) (0.0251)
_cons 15.89*** 0.438*** 0.520*** 0.0415***
(0.483) (0.0389) (0.0390) (0.0110)
N 1072 1072 1072 1072
Mean Dep Var 15.88 0.44 0.52 0.04
Fixed Effects SMT
The dependent variable (column 1) represent the monetary amount of subsidy
shared conditional on individuals selecting into sharing. Columns 2-4 represent




Table A9: Balance Across Treatment Arms
Individual Exogenous Endogenous p-value
Subsidy Sharing Sharing (joint)
Female 0.541 0.547 0.550 0.908
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Education (years) 1.423 1.505 1.619 0.533
(0.115) (0.124) (0.132)
Number of HH members 7.957 8.124 8.331 0.009
(0.118) (0.131) (0.140)
Number of children 0-5years 0.682 0.656 0.674 0.417
(0.027) (0.031) (0.031)
Household Head 0.712 0.684 0.710 0.383
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Poverty score at the hhold level 23.497 23.158 23.737 0.376
(0.428) (0.468) (0.450)
Below Poverty Line 0.555 0.588 0.554 0.417
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Natural Leader 0.114 0.116 0.141 0.288
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Contamination at source 7.326 7.312 7.307 0.000
(0.060) (0.061) (0.062)
Contamination at storage 4.216 4.121 4.153 0.186
(0.078) (0.079) (0.080)
Number of meeting members 30.294 30.322 30.267 0.001
(0.393) (0.405) (0.408)
Beliefs re. Average WTP 78.288 78.286 81.350 0.135
(1.347) (1.382) (1.530)
No beliefs re. Average WTP 0.220 0.196 0.199 0.390
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Small Household (<5 members) 0.243 0.238 0.244 0.890
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
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